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Abstract 
 
 Over the past fifty or so years, American society has endured overwhelming 
changes, affecting nearly all aspects of life. A new set of values emerged and families 
began adopting more liberal mindsets, leading to an increase in the divorce rate. The first 
aim of this study is to explain the social, macro-level causes of divorce. Literature on the 
1960s identifies these influences as the importance of “the self”, feminism, birth control, 
no-fault divorce laws, and religious teachings. Further, I use data from the General Social 
Survey to determine whether micro-level factors influence an individual’s risk of divorce, 
both during this revolution and in the present-day. Regression models examine the impact 
of these variables on divorce trends, and a series of interaction tests measure whether 
these effects have changed over time.  
 Findings indicate that variables such as education and income have an effect on 
an individuals’ risk of divorce. Yet, many of these results become insignificant with the 
introduction of other controls, such as those for religion, which change once participation 
is controlled for. Although analyses of these variables reveals that they cannot fully 
explain the trend of divorce, macro-level variables set the groundwork for an ideological 
revolution and micro-level variables help represent the populations most affected by 
divorce. Since attributes and values cannot be credited with the divorce rate, future 
studies should attempt to identify the variables that affect the risk of divorce on a societal 
level.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
 The 20th century witnessed societal and ideological changes that affected all facets 
of life. In addition to industrialization, scientific discovery, and the start of globalization, 
the 20th century was a time of social change, moving away from many traditional values 
and towards a more independent, liberated mindset. Institutions such as marriage were 
impacted greatly as early as 1920, when the divorce rate nearly doubled from 4.0 
divorces per every 1,000 existing marriages in 1900, to 7.7 divorces per every 1,000 
existing marriages 20 years later (O’Neil 1967:20). Though surprising, these numbers 
failed to truly capture the imminence of the divorce revolution, both statistically and in 
terms of values (Riley 1991).  
 During the earlier years of the 20th century, the American family adhered to a very 
strict, stable Western ideology: a patrilineal, religious, close-knit system containing “the 
source of economic stability and educational, and vocational training” (O’Neil 1967:2). 
Men were the breadwinners and worked long, hard hours to provide for their families, 
while women stayed at home, raised the children and remained dependent on their 
husbands for support (Cherlin 2009). Marriage represented one of the most fundamental 
institutions of society in Western culture (Cherlin 2009). During the 1950s, American 
laws and social expectations had changed little since the mid 1800s (Cherlin 2009). The 
notion of male-dominated households was reaffirmed and reinforced through the law, 
such as the representation of husbands and wives composing of “a single person, 
represented by the husband” in legal proceedings (Schwartz and Han 2014:607). 
Individual freedom for women within their marriages was also not given, out of fear for 
damaging “domestic harmony” (Cherlin 2009:85).  
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 Although it was indeed possible to obtain a divorce during this time, the 
dissolution of marriage was seen as a betrayal of one’s vows. Moral and legal agendas 
shaped the framework for both marriage and divorce, such as legally enforced financial 
support intended to discourage separation. In essence, marriage provided a foundation for 
one’s place in society and obtaining a divorce meant proving that one spouse “had 
committed a serious breach of marital behavior” (Cherlin 2009:85). Halem (1980) 
describes how clerical authorities, civil authorities and the bulk of society viewed 
divorce: “the fear that divorce, by dissolving the family unit, jeopardizes fundamental 
values essential to the well-being of individuals in society” (9). Given the importance of 
the roles of marriage and the traditional family unit in life, it was believed that society 
would be obliterated with the rejection of customary values and the rise of divorce. 
Therefore, the best way to protect the bond of marriage was to restrict access to its 
dissolution (Weitzman 1985).  
 By the second half of the 20th century, a new kind of American family emerged. It 
was more private, secular, and able to take on the changes and challenges brought on by 
the Industrial Revolution, WWII, and other events of that time (Halem 1980). Although it 
had been on the rise in past years, the divorce rate skyrocketed in the years immediately 
following WWII and then again in the early 1970s (Schwartz and Han 2014). A practice 
that received such intense rejection and societal control just a few decades earlier had 
become an integral part of American life. Through identifying the events that occurred 
during these periods of time, we may subsequently determine how the development of 
these ideologies altered traditional American values. One of the most significant 
increases in the divorce rate took place during a time of pivotal change for American 
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society. Herman (1992) describes the 1960s as “that period of social upheaval and 
national self-examination that has been made into an island of time” (87). The grueling 
aftermath of WWII and the Vietnam War left Americans with a need for change (Morgan 
1991; Herman 1992). Post-war attitudes played a large role in explaining why the nation 
was so vulnerable at the time. It is my hope that analyses focusing on the ideologies of 
this period will provide insight into how social patterns affected the institution of 
marriage.  
 In recent years, the divorce rate has leveled off, but it is nowhere near where it 
was at the start of the 20th century. Conducted in 2006, one study on the role of timing in 
divorce found that, for those aged 20-24, the divorce rate has generally declined (Shoen 
and Canudas-Romo 2006:753). For those aged 25 and older during 2006, the divorce rate 
goes slightly upward with some fluctuations (Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006:753). 
Although the divorce rate experienced an initial increase around the time of the mid-
century, it had plateaued by the start of the 20th century and continues to do so today. 
This suggests that the values introduced during that time have not vanished, but have less 
dramatic (yet not negligible) effects on modern day society. The first aim of this paper is 
to identify the kinds of ideologies that influenced these behavioral changes, followed by 
an analysis of how these ideologies continue to affect divorce on the micro-level today.  
 
Macro-Level Factors 
 The 1960s present a variety of ideologies that may be credited with the 
development of fundamental societal changes. These include: the prioritization of the 
individual, feminism and the entrance of women in the workforce, the increasing 
acceptance of birth control, legal divorce reform, religious affiliation and religious 
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teachings. While these are discussed separately in further detail below, it is clear that they 
are linked in a more complex system of interpretation.  
 One of the most influential ideological changes that took place during the 1960s 
was the emergence of humanistic psychology (Herman 1992). The consequences of the 
Vietnam War left Americans with a motivation to implement social change; this 
movement was characterized by two traits, “a growing radical awareness of society’s 
deeply rooted resistance to change, coupled with activists’ still confident commitment to 
bring about change” (Morgan 1991:21). A key component to this ideology lay in the 
emphasis placed on personal gain and improvement. But, this attention towards “the self” 
contradicted some of the main foundations of marriage: “…the traditional law embodied 
the partnership concept of marriage by rewarding sharing and mutual investments in the 
marital community” (Wheeler 1974:374). Thus, the importance placed on personal 
growth in the 1960s “require[d] a new kind of marriage of which each [person] feels 
personally fulfilled” (Cherlin 2009:90). The idea of prioritizing one’s own desires and 
life goals before the norm of getting married could hypothetically have had immense 
effects on the dissolution of marriage.  
 Feminism may also be credited as a cause for social change (Halem 1980). The 
1960’s represented, along with many other ideologies, the second wave of feminism 
(Herman 1992). In relation to society, the experiences of women in America during this 
period highlight how women’s rights have transformed the make-up of the family. Both 
industrialization and World War II created a higher demand for women in the work force, 
introducing women to the idea of economic independence. The slow removal of men and 
women from their traditional roles allowed women to move away from the homemaker 
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stereotype and take control of their lives. “This growing economic independence of 
women and the demise of the self-sufficient household not only extricated women from 
their traditional role as homemakers but provided an incentive to renounce their marital 
responsibilities and to seek divorces” (Halem 1980:58). This particular section aims to 
identify the extent to which women’s rights in the labor force and their entrance into the 
educational system have affected the divorce rate.  
 In addition to these factors, the growing acceptance of birth control and other 
contraceptives has theoretically had an effect on the original incentives for marriage. 
These incentives depend on a division of labor that ensures interdependence (Yenor 
2011). This divide is often placed along gender lines and is enforced through the ability 
of women to reproduce (Yenor 2011). “Having children means conforming, to a degree, 
to the reproductive cycle, which limits human freedom and…equality” (Yenor 2011:183). 
Thus, the invention of birth control introduced women to the option of controlling 
whether or not they become pregnant and, therefore, be forced into a particular role. This 
freedom allowed women a certain degree of choice in determining the path that their lives 
would take. However, given that these regulations previously provided couples with 
motivations to get and stay married, I argue that the availability of this control has 
eliminated the original incentives for marriage and lessened the consequences of divorce. 
 Placing attention towards the institution of marriage itself, one of the core driving 
factors involved in marriage is religion.  
“Religion provides moral principles about how family life should be lived, such 
as the belief that adults should marry before having children. The law provides 
principles about what is permissible and about what rights and obligations family 
members have” (Cherlin 2009:33).  
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Yet another possibility for the dissolution of marriage could thus be a potentially 
decreasing religious population. With the modernization that took place in America 
during this time, it seems logical that people would begin to reject religion and 
spirituality. This was the case in Britain, when advancements in science lead to answers 
to the questions for which people originally turned to religion (Cherlin 2009). In the 
United States, modernization spurred the rejection of many religious norms, such as the 
ability of women to be financially independent, which went against the traditional 
formation that most families abided by (Cherlin 2009). Previously, religion gave families 
a reason to stay together through trying times and many churches even shamed those who 
chose to get a divorce. In the traditional Catholic view, even adultery was not justification 
for divorce and in the traditional Jewish view, divorce was carried out in such a way that 
the husband was given marital freedom while the wife was not (Cherlin 2009). Given the 
increasing divorce rate and the events steering people away from religion, could it be that 
a relationship exists between the divorce rate and American religious identity? 
 In addition to changing values, a number of studies have identified divorce reform 
as playing a key role in the divorce rate (Wright and Stetson 1978; Nakonezny, Shull, and 
Rodgers 1995; Vlosky and Monroe 2002). Until the 1970s, divorce laws were fault-based 
and were granted strictly on the grounds of a few, specified situations. In this system, 
spouses were labeled either “guilty” or “innocent” of committing a serious marital 
offense such as adultery, cruelty or desertion (Wheeler, 1974:15; Weitzman, 1985:9; 
Nakonezny et al. 1995:478). The implementation of the no-fault system began in 1970, 
when California passed the first law terminating the necessity of fault in divorce 
(Wheeler, 1974). By the late 1980’s, most states had passed some form of a no-fault 
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reform (Nakonezny et al. 1995). These new, less restrictive laws made getting a divorce 
much easier, yet whether they had any direct effect on the divorce rate is debatable 
(Nakonezny et al. 1995). Statistics indicate that states with more lenient divorce laws do 
have a higher rate of divorce than those with more restrictive laws (Nakonezny et al. 
1995), but other factors must be taken into consideration before drawing a causal 
connection, such as the possibility that these states passed no-fault reforms after the 
divorce rate increased.  
 It will be the aim of this study to explain the extent to which the sudden increase 
in divorce can be credited to these events and ideologies. In light of the variations within 
the divorce rate towards the second half of the 20th century, statistics must be examined 
within the context of their time. Social, political and ideological transformation 
characterized America during both of these dramatic spikes, but this correlation does not 
equal causation. Perhaps, by studying the institution of marriage through the framework 
of macro-level influences on society, I will succeed in determining which societal trends 
were present, how they affected American values, and the extent to which they continue 
to affect society today. 
Focus on “The Self” 
 The emergence of humanistic psychology in the social sciences represents the 
craving of society to understand social interaction and individual experience, both of 
which were previously considered to be private spheres (Herman 1992). One of the key 
components of this new philosophy was the shift of focus on to “the self.” At the core of 
these values lay the desire to separate oneself from the ills of society and focus on 
physical and emotional enjoyment. Herman (1992) explains humanistic psychology 
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within the context of the social, political and ideological upheaval taking place at the 
time: 
[In humanistic psychology,] “the most urgent human needs were to feel good 
about oneself, experience one’s emotions directly, and grow emotionally, ‘the 
self’ was inherently healthy and contained a kind of divine spark that moved the 
human organism inexorably towards a process of growth and ‘becoming’; that 
‘the self’s’ subjective experience was the highest authority; that scientific 
commitment to objectivity was bankrupt and useless; in need of an infusion of 
humanistic values” (Herman 1992:88). 
 
In essence, this new ideology emphasized placing individual achievement, personal 
responsibility, and self-improvement above all other obligations (Herman 1992; Cherlin 
2009).  
 Traditionally, achievement and commitment were almost completely dependent 
upon the family unit. Success and happiness were contingent upon the fulfillment of 
marital vows, which consisted of a woman’s dedication to the home and children and a 
man’s ability to provide a family with life’s necessities (Weitzman 1985). Since 
happiness and success were based on things couples jointly produced instead of 
individually, such as children and financial stability, Cherlin (2009) argues that it was 
easier to find reasons to stay together. However, this altered mindset placed a new set of 
goals on the horizon, none of which required the family unit to achieve.  
 Therefore, the question remains: does this focus on “the self” impact people’s 
inclinations to get a divorce? If the commitments included in maintaining a marriage are 
no longer in line with one’s personal goals, is that justification to end it? Marks (1986) 
found that, when people enter into a relationship with personal “marriage agendas” and 
have no motivations such as children to stay together, the force of their own concerns and 
desires can “stretch a marriage precariously thin” (53). Yet this finding applies primarily 
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to couples that enter marriage with previously conceived ideas and no children, making it 
unrepresentative of the American population (Marks 1986).  
 On the other hand, Marks (1986) believes that marriage can provide a “safe 
haven” where people may go to “retreat and get recharged, enabling them to return to the 
all-important outside struggle with replenished vigor” (70). In this theory, individuals 
appreciate marriage not within the context of responsibility, but as a personal refuge 
away from the discomforts of life (Marks 1986). Marks identifies a number of potential 
outcomes regarding the influence of the self on marital tendencies, many of which have 
to do with the individual and their person agendas. 
 Cherlin (2009) maintains that this “expressive individualism” is not necessarily 
incompatible with lifelong marriage, “but it requires a new kind of marriage in which the 
spouses are free to grow and change and in which each person feels personally fulfilled” 
(90). While preserving a relationship where both people place their personal goals ahead 
of marital commitment may be unrealistic, it is possible given the right mindsets and 
values (Cherlin 2009). What Cherlin (2009) introduces here is not a decline in the 
institution of marriage, but a change in its construction.  
 The strength of this ideological revolution may, therefore, have been enough to 
motivate some to accept divorce as an appropriate solution to their unhappy marriage 
(Halem 1980). Whereas marriages were originally held together through factors such as 
religious belief, public opinion, and economic dependence, the new ideas of romanticism, 
individualism and happiness brought on by “the self” verified divorce as an adequate 
option (Halem 1980). 
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Feminism and the Entrance of Women into the Work Force 
 Many have cited women’s participation in the workforce as the cause for the 
increased levels of divorce (Halem 1980; Yenor 2011). The ability of women to become 
economically independent from men has eliminated one of the original and traditional 
reasons for marriage: economic support. Yenor (2011) reasons that, faced with the 
realistic option of supporting oneself and a child, women no longer feel the need to 
commit to a man. This implies two possibilities, first, that women may be less likely to 
get married in the first place, since they are free from the dependence previously imposed 
upon them, and second, that the economic consequences of getting a divorce have been 
significantly lessened, if not irrelevant, to the independent woman.  
 Traditional notions of marriage have depended on the separate identities of men 
and women as the breadwinners and homemakers, respectively (Schwartz and Han 2014). 
Schwartz and Han (2014) cite Becker’s (1974) exchange theory and suggest that, since 
men have an advantage in the labor market and women in housework, “the gains to 
marriage are maximized when high-wage men match with low-wage women, and thus 
the risk of divorce is heightened when wives out earn their husbands” (607). Challenging 
the balance of power within the family alters the benefits associated with gendered roles, 
increasing the risk of divorce. This theory therefore believes that, through a woman’s 
economic independence, gender specified roles lose their legitimacy and the rewards 
originally associated with these roles are eradicated (Schwartz and Han 2014).   
 Similar to that theory, Rogers (2004) states that, the more independent a woman 
becomes, the more likely she is to grow dissatisfied with her marriage. Economic 
independence theory suggests that, as women become involved in the work force and are 
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able to contribute more to the family income, they begin to perceive the division of labor 
in the household as unequal (Rogers 2004). This growing resistance and the desire of 
women to renegotiate household gender roles may be associated with marital conflict 
(Rogers 2004). Therefore, an increase in wives’ income could not only provide them with 
the resources to leave their marriages, but it also confirms their overall dissatisfaction 
with traditional marriage arrangements (Rogers 2004). 
 Since about the 1980s, the divorce rate has leveled off. Given that many credit 
this increase to women’s entrance into the work force, how can we understand this 
relationship in light of those statistics? Rogers (2004) and Schwartz and Han (2014) both 
explain the leveling out of divorce as a result of growing public acceptance. Rogers 
(2004) cites role collaboration theory, which suggests that the risk of divorce is highest 
when the wife’s income is very low or very high- suggesting that marriage stability is 
strongest when perceptions of equality and a fair division of labor are perceived (Rogers 
2004). In this theory, wives’ resources are a source of marital equality and power, 
“increasing the likelihood that wives expect [and get] more equitable marital 
relationships, which influences marital quality and stability” (Rogers 2004:62). If, 
however, this power (or income) falls below or exceeds that of the husband’s, then this 
balance is thrown off and the risk of divorce increases. This overall concept stems from 
the necessity of public acceptance, since wives, equipped with the resources to support 
themselves, are able to invest in and negotiate more equal and satisfying relationships 
(Rogers 2004). In order for this to happen, a growing number of the male population 
would need to accept these new gender roles and divisions of labor. 
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 Schwartz and Han (2014) further attribute this change to diffusion theory. This 
theory suggests that the acceptance of a revolution begins slowly, but once a “critical 
mass” has been reached, acceptance speeds up and results in a reduction of social costs 
(Schwartz and Han 2014:610). Their study specifically focuses on the acceptance of 
marriages in which wives have the educational advantage and reveals that these 
marriages would initially be more likely than others to end in divorce (Schwartz and Han 
2014). Since this theory is based upon the idea that marriages consisting of women that 
do not adhere to traditional roles are more likely to divorce, these conclusions may also 
apply to marriages in which women hold significant roles in the work force. As more 
women enter the work force and the prevalence of these socially unaccepted, unstable 
marriages increases, so does the divorce rate. However, according to diffusion theory, 
individuals observe others forming these relationships and acceptance begins to increase, 
resulting in a decline of the discomfort that initially led to divorce (Schwartz and Han 
2014). Therefore, diffusion theory explains the relationship between the leveling off of 
the divorce rate and women’s entrance into the work force in terms of how the population 
has become more comfortable with a less traditional, more equal kind of relationship 
(Schwartz and Han 2014). As the prevalence of these marriages rise, the divorce rate 
levels off. This accounts for the fact that divorce saw an initial increase (when women’s 
entrance into the work force was a new concept and not widely accepted by their male 
partners, causing conflict within marriages) followed by a plateau (when the population 
had more widely accepted women’s participation in the work force and the conflict 
originally associated with it decreased). 
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Birth Control and Contraception 
 The opportunity for women to control their fertility presented a major advance in 
feminism during this time (Yenor 2011). Initially, the act of sex would typically have 
resulted in pregnancy, causing women to become dependent on men for support. Sex was 
used as a weapon to ensure the dependence of women and to “keep women in the posture 
of defeat, a symbol of male dominance and immanence” (Yenor 2011:190). The chance 
to avoid becoming pregnant through birth control and other forms of contraception 
allowed women to separate maternity and dependence. Yenor (2011) explains the female 
role through Marxism, comparing the male-headed households to the dominant class and 
the housewives to the oppressed class. By forcing women to be economically dependent 
on their husbands, the family enforces a system of exploitation upon women by their 
husbands (Yenor 2011). Thus, Yenor (2011) highlights the importance that contraception 
has played in women’s independence: “Women should be able to avoid pregnancy when 
they have sex (for this, contraception and abortion), and they should be able to become 
pregnant without being dependent on a man” (Yenor 2011:185). The goal to “divorce sex 
and reproduction” is made possible for women by the option of choosing when they get 
pregnant, if they get pregnant, and by whom (Yenor 2011:186).  
 Further, the ability of women to control their ability to reproduce has allowed sex 
to become more of a free, independent act, unrestrained and unconnected to other aspects 
of life (Yenor 2011). Yenor (2011) believes that marriage is a mundane, inconvenient 
institution that becomes boring for both people when their mindsets and goals change 
through time. Once sex was no longer associated with the commitment of a man and 
woman to a child, it could remain “unconnected to other endeavors, following only the 
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human will when and where it leads” (Yenor 2011:190). Thus, this theory holds that the 
availability of contraceptives and birth control has affected the institution of marriage 
and, now free of the obligations linked with children, the willingness to get a divorce. 
 Halem (1980) proposes conflict theory and suggests that the individual is in 
constant conflict with the norms of society. The family is an inherently unstable unit, kept 
together only by the “repression or sublimination of individual desires and internal 
conflicts” (Halem 1980:97). Faced with the option of casual sex, the need of the 
individual to exercise control and resist desire is eliminated, leading to the destruction of 
marriage. Conflict theory therefore maintains that the glue holding a family together, or 
the forced control of an individual to adhere to society’s notions of the family, has been 
destabilized with the elimination of the need to repress one’s desires (Halem 1980). 
Although Halem (1980) does not mention it, the idea that marriages function to control 
the individual and inhibit their desires could also be a functionalist argument. Once these 
particular and traditional notions of marriage became unnecessary, the functions of 
marriage in society were weakened. 
From Fault-Based to No-Fault Divorce 
 The second sharp increase in the divorce rate remains consistent throughout the 
1970s (Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006:753). During this time, the United States was in 
the process of moving from a fault-based divorce system to a no-fault system. Divorce 
reform has commonly been cited as another potential cause of the divorce revolution 
(Wright and Stetson 1978; Nakonezny et al. 1995; Vlosky and Monroe 2002). While the 
direct causation is debatable, the divorce reform no doubt made the process of getting a 
divorce much easier and less psychologically painful to those involved (Nakonezny et al. 
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1995). In the fault-based system, divorce was granted as a reward to the innocent party 
and a punishment to the guilty party. Alimony, child support, and property distribution 
were accordingly “awarded” to the innocent person and the quantity of economic 
settlement was linked to the income of the guilty person (Nakonezny et al. 1995). Since 
grounds for divorce were limited, couples pursuing divorce would fabricate evidence, 
falsely accuse each other, and confess to things that never happened in an attempt to 
prove fault (Weitzman 1985). The limiting nature of this system often ruined the 
possibility of reconciliation and created an agenda of bitterness and conflict within the 
process (Nakonezny et al. 1995; Weitzman, 1985). Therefore, the implementation of no-
fault divorce serves the purpose of “bring[ing] divorce legislation into line with the social 
reality of marital breakdown as a more common and more acceptable event in 
contemporary society” (Wheeler 1974:37). 
 Only a few years after California passed the first no-fault law, Wright and Stetson 
(1978) argued that no-fault divorce was not to blame for the sudden increase in the 
divorce rate. They concluded that, regardless of the effects of no-fault reforms on 
individuals, they have nothing to do with the divorce rate (Wright and Stetson 1978). 
However, this study is slightly outdated and I therefore question its validity.  
 On the other hand, Nakonezny et al. (1995) found that the switch from fault-based 
divorce to no-fault divorce was responsible for the significant increase in the divorce rate. 
This conclusion is supported through the use of a no-treatment group (or a control group), 
which revealed an increase of .80 divorces for every 1,000 individuals per year in those 
states that adopted no-fault divorce (Nakonezny et al. 1995:475). The reason for this 
increase was simple: “provid[ing] a divorce law that makes divorce less restrictive by 
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reducing the legal and the economic obstacles of divorce by abolishing the concept of 
fault” (Nakonezny et al. 1995:487).  
 Wheeler (1974) and Riley (1991) agree with Wright and Stetson (1978) and 
explain the divorce rate as a result of population growth and a heightened life expectancy 
following WWII. After WWII, the population did experience a sudden and intense period 
of growth, justifying Wheeler’s (1974) theory. Once “the ‘baby boom’ generation ha[d] 
reached the age of marriage and divorce”, the divorce rate inevitably rose (Wheeler 
1974:28). Given the fact that this generation came of age during the 1960s, they grew up 
in an environment that perpetuated the new, radical ideals addressed in this paper. Riley 
(1991) credits the divorce rate as being a consequence of the population’s extended life 
expectancy, which was most likely caused by the scientific and technological 
advancements of that time. Before WWII, people lived relatively shorter lives and 
unhappy marriages would typically end with the death of one spouse (Riley 1991). 
However, given this extended life span, many marriages had started lasting far longer. 
Now faced with the option of ending their marriages all together, many Americans saw 
divorce as an attractive solution (Riley 1991). The combination of divorce reform and a 
longer life expectancy therefore work together to explain the heightened divorce rate 
during this period.  
Transformed Religious Teachings 
 During the 1950’s, religion played a significant role in shaping the American 
family (Cherlin 2009). Church membership skyrocketed from 1850, when 34% of 
Americans affiliated with a church, to 1950, when this number rose to 59% (Cherlin 
2009:73). Involvement within a church meant taking part in activities that were geared 
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towards the breadwinner/homemaker stereotypes of that time (Cherlin 2009). Many 
religions, such as Catholicism and most Protestant denominations, would only allow a 
divorce on the strict grounds of adultery or desertion and divorced church members were 
often shamed into leaving (Cherlin 2009). Therefore, while religion played an undeniable 
role in reinforcing the bond and structure of marriage before the social transformation of 
the 1960’s, the questions of whether religion maintained this role after the 1960s, and to 
what extent, remains.  
 The divorce rate, while stable during the years when people adhered to the 1950’s 
American family structure, began to rise again in the early 1960’s, after WWII and during 
the Vietnam War (Cherlin 2009). Seeing that religion placed such a strong emphasis on 
the strength of marriage and the family, it would seem logical that, with a rise in the 
divorce rate, American religiosity would experience a decrease. In addition, many of the 
ideologies that emerged during the 1960’s had to do with individualism and self-
expression, concepts that went against some traditional, religious values (Cherlin 2009). 
Rationally, advancements in globalization, modernization and ideology would represent a 
decrease in religious vigor.  
 However, Americans have shown no such decrease in their affiliation with 
religion (Cherlin 2009). Even though many American institutions were secularized 
during this time, overall affiliation remained, as Cherlin (2009) explains, relatively 
unchanged. In fact, “the strength of American religion is striking. In no other Western 
country is religious practice so vital and so influential in shaping people’s beliefs” 
(Cherlin 2009:33). The expectation that countries will become more secular as they 
modernize and especially as new ideologies are introduced has been shockingly 
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inaccurate when applied to the United States (Cherlin, 2009). Reasons for this religious 
dedication are explained by Kent (1992) through social exchange theory. Kent (1992) 
describes the 1960’s rise in religiosity as a way to “provide resolutions to crises of 
meaning” and to allow a sense of order to social life (122). Faced with the fact that 
movements in the 1960s were not all successful in initiating change, many activists 
experienced a loss of hope and personal identity (Kent 1992). To deal with this 
disappointment, many transformed themselves from activist to dedicated churchgoer, 
turning to religion as a way to cut their losses, yet continue to remain within a group. But, 
since a decline in American religiosity is not the answer to this disconnect, we are faced 
with the question: how were people able to maintain their religious identities while 
simultaneously accepting the collapse of marital status?  
 The answer lies in the changes that occurred not only in the values and style 
characterizing religion during the mid-century, but also the ways in which religious 
institutions reacted to the increasing divorce rate (Cherlin 2009). Cherlin (2009) outlines 
how many religions transformed themselves by placing an increased emphasis on 
personal growth and individual happiness. In the years preceding the ideological 
revolution, the church discouraged divorce with a sharp rigor (Halem 1980). Efforts to 
limit divorce included strict guidelines regarding qualifications as well as restrictions on 
remarriage (Halem 1980). However, the second half of the 20th century saw many 
religions change their ideology to fit a more liberal and individualist standpoint. For 
example, American Catholics moved their emphasis away from the Church as an 
institution and focused more on “individual responsibility for one’s faith, [through a]… 
shift toward[s] viewing God as loving and forgiving rather than as punitive and 
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judgmental, and they placed greater importance on personal exploration and discovery” 
(Cherlin 2009:106). This previously mentioned ideal of “the self” allowed people the 
option of finding happiness in relationships outside of those found through marriage 
(Cherlin 2009). The church began to see marriage not through rules and tradition, but 
through the potential growth and personal benefits that it could provide (Cherlin 2009).  
 The underlying explanation of how someone could maintain their religious 
identity while diminishing one of its core traditional values therefore lies in the responses 
of the church. With the divorce rate continuing to rise throughout the 1960s, 70s, 80s and 
90s, many divorced individuals turned to their churches for solace and support (Cherlin 
2009). In response, Mainline Protestant churches began allowing remarriage after any 
form of divorce (Cherlin 2009:109), while Conservative Protestants centered their 
divorce ideology towards helping divorced people heal (Cherlin, 2009). Catholics have 
responded to the divorce rate by raising the rate of annulments, which is the only form of 
divorce that they recognize (Cherlin 2009). On the other hand, many Evangelical 
Christians began to focus their attention on encouraging couples to stay together by 
intensifying the importance of marriage (Gushee 2008). Gushee (2008) recommends that 
couples that are considering divorce should be offered tax cuts as a motivation to undergo 
counseling. Throughout this variety of responses to the divorce rate, many religions that 
initially centered their teachings on control have focused more attention on the 
strengthening of marriage and continue this method today (Gushee 2008; Glass and 
Levchak 2014). Thus, even through societal and ideological changes, religious affiliation 
in America has remained relatively steady, a characteristic setting it apart from many 
other developed countries (Cherlin 2009).  
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 In studying the relationship between divorce and religious transformation, it is 
important to address the question of “which came first?” Did the divorce revolution occur 
as a result of this alteration in religious teachings? Or did religion change its focus after 
the divorce revolution began, as a way to accommodate those wishing to get a divorce 
and maintain their religion? Questioning the direction of this relationship brings up a 
number of differing theories, each of which aims to further explain the prevalence of 
religion in America. Samenfink (1958) suggests a discrepancy between the teachings of 
the Roman Catholic Church and the behavior of people who would consider themselves 
to be “good” Roman Catholics (163). This disconnect exists specifically in teachings 
regarding marital relations. At the time of this study, the Roman Catholic Church 
maintained, first, that marriage was a sacramental act and second, that any “artificial 
means” of preventing contraception were “sinful” (Samenfink 1958:164). Ultimately 
Samenfink (1958) found “some indication that a hiatus did actually exists between what 
these young people subscribed to in theory and carried out in practice” (163). The fact 
that these “formal subscriptions” to religious teachings in marriage did exist during the 
time of this study, yet were not always applied, suggests that, at least in the case of 
Roman Catholics, certain values had yet to change (Samenfink 1958). This study 
proposes that people started adhering to the American secular views of marriage on their 
own, thus putting the divorce revolution before altered religious values (Samenfink 
1958:163).  
 A contrasting perspective would suggest that religious transformation took place 
before this revolution happened. Kent (1992) describes the religious transformation as 
something that took place as a way for people to cope with the failure “to bring about the 
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revolution by radical action” (129). As previously described, individuals turned to 
religion partly because they needed a new technique to approach social change. This 
viewpoint therefore suggests that religious transformation took place not as a response to 
the divorce revolution, but as a new way to welcome social changes like it. “The 
revolution would still come, but its arrival would be heralded by a personal 
transformation of purified individuals” (Kent 1992:129). While this theory does not cite 
the divorce revolution as a specifically anticipated change, it does suggest that religious 
ideologies were altered as a new means to a similarly accepted goal. 
 
Micro-Level Distribution Factors 
 Taking all of these factors into account helps in the understanding of how changes 
in values have influenced divorce. Given that most of the transformation took place 
around the mid 20th century, this study now aims to detect which patterns continue to 
affect the divorce rate today. Although the rate has leveled off in recent years, divorce 
has become a fairly standard occurrence. Do the ideologies and values introduced earlier 
in this paper continue to affect the divorce rate as they did before, or have their influences 
leveled off as the divorce rate has? In other words, are we still experiencing the diluted 
effects of the 1960s, or are there new, additional ideas that contribute to the divorce rate 
today? Further, how do micro-level factors play a role in divorce? Are certain 
demographic groups or religions at a higher risk of divorce than others? For example, 
during the time of the Industrial Revolution, families exposed to poverty were forced to 
stray away from traditional notions of the family and became susceptible to divorce as a 
result (O’Neil 1967). Seeing as low-income families may have been more likely to get 
divorced years ago, is that still the case today? Through studying the relationship between 
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age at first marriage, race, participation in the workforce, educational attainment, social 
class, religion, region and divorce, this study aims to gain insight into whether certain 
groups have a higher risk of divorce than others.  
Age at first marriage: 
 Kposowa (1998) found a similar pattern to those suggested in other studies, that 
women who marry at a young age have a higher probability of getting divorced. 
Although there are a number of factors that may contribute to this fact, it aligns with the 
idea that marriages, now made longer by the increased life expectancy, have less of a 
chance of ending from the death of one spouse. Thus, the earlier a woman gets married, 
the longer her marriage will be, and the more time there is for her marriage to become 
unhappy and result in divorce (Kposowa 1998). 
 Weed (1974) conducted a study over the course of ten years to measure the 
relationship between the risk of divorce and younger couples. First done in 1960 and then 
replicated in 1970, Weed (1974) found that younger marriages couldn’t be credited for 
the divorce rate. However, this study was conducted with a consideration for a number of 
other variables that are irrelevant to this study, making its results complex and difficult to 
apply here. 
Race: 
 Further, an individual’s race can be used as a factor to determine the risk of 
divorce. Studying this particular variable will hopefully provide insight into how divorce, 
marriage, and the family are affected by discrimination, inequality, interracial marriage 
and other social factors. Kposowa (1998) also looked at the likelihood of same-race 
couples to get divorced and found that African American women have a much higher risk 
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than their white counterparts. The results of Kposowa’s (1998) study discovered that, by 
the end of 5 years of marriage, 20% of African Americans are expected to get a divorce, 
whereas this number is only 6% for whites (537). After 25 years of marriage, 70% of 
African Americans are expected to get divorced, while only 33% of whites are expected 
to get divorced within that same period (Kposowa 1998:537). Although there are many 
explanations offered for these results, a particularly interesting one refers to the bitterness 
of African American wives towards their husbands. Since opportunities for African 
American men have been limited in the past, they are perceived by their wives as 
incapable of fulfilling the “breadwinner” role (Kposowa 1998:543). “In time, the wife 
may come to view the marriage more as a liability on her, rather than an asset, and thus 
be more predisposed to terminating the union” (Kposowa 1998:543). Given that the white 
male has successfully fulfilled this role throughout history, this fact may help to explain 
the heightened risk of African Americans to get divorced, relative to their white 
counterparts.  
 The idea that race could play a part in the divorce rate is intriguing, since the 
amount of interracial couples has increased over the past few years. In 1970, less than 1% 
of all married couples were interracial and by 2000, that number had jumped to 6% 
(Bratter and King 2008:161). However, studies examining these relationships have 
indicated that, “crossing racial lines still violates enduring norms of who should and 
should not marry whom” (Bratter and King 2008:160). A study by Bratter and King 
(2008) examining the likelihood of divorce among interracial couples versus same-race 
couples in the 1980s concluded that within 10 years of marriage, interracial couples were 
far more likely than same-race couples to get divorced (167). The biggest disparity 
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occurred among marriages initiated between the years 1985 and 1989, “where 55% of 
interracial marriages divorced by their 10th year compared to 35.6% of same-race 
marriages” (Bratter and King 2008:167). 
 Furstenberg (1994), Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) and Brown, Orbuch, and 
Bauermeister (2008) all concluded similar results to those of Kposowa (1998), that 
African Americans are less likely to marry, more likely to divorce, and less likely to 
remarry. According to Furstenberg (1994), 10 years after marriage, 47% of blacks have 
separated or divorced, compared to 28% of non-Hispanic whites (32). While these 
statistics may be intriguing, it is unclear whether Furstenberg (1994) controlled for other 
variables, such as income, or simply obtained his facts from census data. Similarly, 
Brown et al. (2008) found that black Americans had about two times the odds of divorce 
than their white American counterparts (192). Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) found that 
Native American women are more than twice as likely to divorce than white women, 
whereas Asian women are twice as likely not to experience divorce as white women (61). 
The explanation offered in this study was similar to the one given by Kposowa (1998), 
that the limited resources offered to minority groups of men in the United States make 
women perceive a decrease in their overall marital gain (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 
1996:61).  
 Although Zhang and Hook (2009) found no statistically significant relationship 
between interracial marriage and the risk of divorce, measuring race and ethnicity along 
with other factors, such as location, indicated a slight relationship, with mixed marriages 
that include blacks as the least stable, followed by Hispanics (Zhang and Hook 2009). 
Marriages including Asians were the most stable, a finding that aligns with those of past 
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studies, such as Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) (Zhang and Hook 2009). Finally, 
marriages with a black husband and a white wife were found to be the least stable (Zhang 
and Hook 2009:104). These results suggest the persistence of racism directed towards 
black men, supported by the finding that white women married to black men reported 
more experiences with first-hand racism (Zhang and Hook 2009:104).   
Participation in the Work Force: 
 As discussed earlier, women’s entrance into the work and labor forces has been 
credited as one of the driving factors in the divorce revolution (O’Neil 1967; Halem 
1980; Rogers 2004; Yenor 2011). While this may be the case, Raley, Mattingly, and 
Bianchi (2006) argue that this shift towards the female breadwinner role is disrupted by 
other life factors. For example, they found that, with the birth of a child, women are more 
likely than men to leave work and stay home, whereas husbands are more likely to 
increase their hours of work when they become fathers (Raley et al. 2006:14). This 
theory suggests that the birth of a child works to enhance traditional notions of marriage, 
further pushing women into the homemaker role and the men into the breadwinner role. 
As such, they reason that women’s participation in the workforce does not have as strong 
an effect on marriage stability as previously believed (Raley et al. 2006).  
 Yenor (2011) attributes the mere ability of women to earn a living to the changing 
state of marriage. The division of power with a household hinges upon the dependence of 
women on their husbands, creating a strong patriarchal relationship within the family. 
The power involved in earning money thus contributes to this division. Therefore, 
separate from a woman’s occupation or the amount of money she makes, having the 
option to make money is what gives women power and encourages an equal relationship 
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(Yenor 2011). Although it has been argued that the entrance of women into the workforce 
has damaged traditional notions of marriage, since it allows women the option of 
supporting themselves, Yenor (2011) argues that this independence is crucial in 
establishing the “dignity of a woman” (Yenor 2011:184). Interestingly, this was one of 
the few viewpoints that explained women’s entrance into the workforce through the 
framework of promoting feminism, instead of corrupting marriage.  
Education: 
  Women’s participation in the work force was accompanied by a growing number 
of women becoming educated. Kposowa (1998) found that “women with some education 
(in addition to high school) were nearly 1.3 times as likely to divorce as women with only 
high school education” (541). Women that have completed college and obtained graduate 
degrees were 1.7 times more likely to divorce than women with only a high school 
education (Kposowa 1998:541). Clearly, this study suggests that, the higher a women’s 
educational attainment, the more likely she is to get divorced. This idea is explained by 
the potential for educated women to have more choices, be more career oriented, and be 
“less willing to stay in unions that act as constraints on their career advancement and 
personal freedom” (Kposowa 1998:543). However, analyses from this study fail to 
legitimately take into account the effects of husbands’ education on marriage.  
 In contrast to these findings, Schwartz and Han (2014) found that, while 
marriages where wives had more education than their husbands had an increased 
likelihood of divorced in the 1970s, this is no longer true (621). Their study states that, 
that in recent years, wives’ educational advantage has no effect on the likelihood of a 
divorce (Schwartz and Han 2014). This suggests a change in attitudes associated with 
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gender expectations in marriage and also a decline in the prominence of traditional roles 
(Schwartz and Han 2014). Similar to these results, yet offering a difference explanation, 
Brown et al. (2008) found that, contrary to popular belief, levels of education do not 
necessary lead to divorce. Instead, the more education each spouse has, the less likely 
they are to get a divorce (195). The contradicting results found by Kposowa (1998) and 
Schwartz and Han (2014) suggest the need to further study the effects of both spouse’s 
education on the likelihood of divorce. 
 Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) also found that more education decreases the 
likelihood of divorce. They suggest that their findings support Becker’s idea (1981) that 
higher levels of educational attainment “increase marital utility from the division of labor 
associated with marriage” (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996:60). Further, this relationship 
could be the result of “positive assortative mating”; here, a man’s higher education allows 
him to offer more money and human capital, therefore increasing the woman’s perception 
that she benefits from the marriage (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler on Becker (1981) 1996:60).  
 Martin and Parashar (2006) explain these results by an increase in educated 
women’s “restrictive attitudes” towards divorce (37). Since the 1970s, educated women 
are more likely to both disapprove of divorce and also to get a divorce (Martin and 
Parashar 2006). In other words, “highly educated women’s decreasing uncertainty about 
stable marriages lowers the personal salience of divorce for them” (Martin and Parashar 
2006:38).  
Income: 
 In considering the effects of income, regardless of the sex or composition of the 
primary breadwinner arrangement, Kposowa (1998) found that families with higher 
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incomes were consistently less likely to get divorced. This may be explained by the idea 
that the marital conflict accompanying poverty and financial burden is greatly reduced, 
therefore resulting in a decrease in marital breakdown (Kposowa 1998). The overall 
capital held by a family thus contributes to their feelings of security and lessens the 
effects of this factor on marital conflict.  
 Rogers and DeBoer (2001) found that changes in women’s resources consistently 
reduced the risk of divorce. These changes include both increases and decreases in 
income (up to a certain point), and they come at little cost to husbands’ happiness 
(Rogers and DeBoer 2001:469-470). While some believe that wives’ income creates a 
feeling of financial stability and therefore less commitment to the family, Rogers and 
DeBoer (2001) suggest that increases in wives’ financial resources strengthen marital 
happiness and stabilize the family (470). However, the study also found that reported 
happiness within marriages decreases when women contribute at least or more than half 
of the total income (Rogers and DeBoer 2001).. 
 In another study conducted by Rogers (2004) three years later, he found a 
significant relationship between wives’ income and the risk of divorce. According to this 
study, with each additional $1,000 in wives’ actual income, up to a certain point, the odds 
of divorce increase by approximately 2.5% to 3% (Rogers 2004:67). This supports the 
economic independence theory, stating that marital stability is enhanced by wives’ 
economic dependence on their husbands (Rogers 2004). Rogers’ (2004) study also found 
a curvilinear association between the percentage of wives’ income and the probability of 
divorce. When wives’ percentage of income was below 50%, any increase elevated the 
risk of divorce (Rogers 2004:68). When wives contributed 50% or more, the relationship 
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leveled off and finally, when wives contributed more than 60% of the total family 
income, the risk of divorce declined (Rogers 2004: 68). These findings are in direct 
contradiction to those in Rogers’ earlier study (2001) and although he found a curvilinear 
association in the later one, his results still indicate a relationship between women who 
earn a significant amount of the total income and the risk of divorce. Sweezy and 
Tiefenthaler (1996) also found that women’s income levels have a statistically significant 
and positive effect on their risk of divorce. These and Rogers’ (2004) findings can be 
explained through the theory that women who work outside of the home “derive and 
provide less utility in marriage” (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996:61). As their “shadow 
price” decreases, the probability that they will get divorced increases (Sweezy and 
Tiefenthaler 1996:61). 
 Brown et al. (2008) take it one step further by incorporating race and gender into 
the effects that income have on divorce. Their study found that greater income reported 
by black husbands decreased the likelihood of divorce, whereas greater income reported 
by white husbands increased the likelihood of divorce (Brown et al. 2008:195). Kposowa 
(1998) offers an explanation for these results earlier, in that economic inequalities work 
to highlight the disadvantages experienced by many black American males, while these 
advantages may be expected for white American males. These conclusions can be applied 
to the situation that is described here, simply by further highlighting the expectations of 
white versus black men. When black males experience financial success, it appears as 
though they have defeated these obstacles and leads to an increase of marital cohesion, 
while the white male’s inability to provide financial resources is seen as a failure.  
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Religion/Religiosity: 
 Religion is also an important lens through which to view marital stability, since it 
provides guidelines and a framework through which spouses may shape their marriages 
(Brown et al. 2008). Cherlin (2009) maintains that whether or not individuals identify 
with any religion at all has an effect on divorce. After the first 15 years of marriage, it 
was found that an estimated 41% of religious women got divorced, compared to 56% of 
those with no religious affiliation at all (Cherlin 2009:112). This may be the result of 
religious institutions that support marriage stability, yet the vagueness of these results 
suggest the possibility that other factors were not seriously taken into account, such as the 
strength of one’s religious affiliation and the years during which the study was 
conducted. 
 Mahoney (2010), Vaaler, Ellison, and Powers (2009) and a number of other 
studies found similar results. Mahoney (2010) discovered that, the higher the religious 
attendance, particularly by wives or by couples attending the same denomination 
together, the lower the risk of divorce. This relationship exists only if either the wife is a 
dedicated member of the spiritual community or the couple is equally as dedicated, and 
these results were found throughout a number of studies (Furstenberg 1994; Brown et al. 
2008; Vaaler et al. 2009; Mahoney 2010). Brown et al. (2008) provides an explanation 
for this finding, that the risk of divorce decreases when just the wife attends more 
religious services, and suggests that wives’ attendance in community gatherings 
“provides an important resource for maintaining the stability of marriage over time” 
(194). Through attending religious services, wives are given the tools they need to deal 
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with unhappy marriages, whereas husbands turn to other organizational practices to deal 
with these issues (Brown et al. 2008).  
 Mahoney (2010) and Vaaler et al. (2009) further found that a higher risk of 
divorce exists for couples of mixed faiths and for couples where husbands attend 
religious services more than their wives (814; 931). There are a number of reasons given 
for this discovery, most notably the one proposing that highly religious men may adhere 
to a patriarchal gender ideology, which may not appeal to less religious women (Vaaler et 
al. 2009:931). This idea suggests an area for potential further study, comparing spouses’ 
religious affiliations and the degree to which their attitudes regarding gender differ. 
Finally, Mahoney (2010) found the risk of divorce to be heightened with mixed faith 
couples and when “a less religiously committed spouse resists the spiritual expectations 
of a spouse or spiritual community” (Mahoney 2010:814).  
 Vaaler et al. (2009) found that the risk of divorce is lowest when both husband 
and wife attend services, since “families that pray together, stay together” (Vaaler et al. 
2009:930). This may be due to a shared ideology, or possibly to the fact that religious 
couples may face higher social costs of marital dissolution (Vaaler et al. 2009). Further, 
they found that one particular type of mixed-faith marriage appears to have the highest 
risk of divorce: couples in which the wives are members of an “exclusivist (i.e. 
fundamentalist, evangelical, or sectarian) faith are especially prone to divorce” (Vaaler et 
al. 2009:930). The study addressed this finding by explaining that women identifying 
with these types of religions often try to “domesticate” men, giving them more family 
responsibility and leadership (Vaaler et al. 2009:931). Women that are disappointed with 
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any failure in these responsibilities may also be more inclined to get a divorce (Vaaler et 
al. 2009:931).  
 Glass and Levchak (2014) found that conservative Protestant communities have 
higher levels of divorce than others. Although there may potentially be a number of 
factors contributing to these results, one possible explanation is that, “as conservative 
Protestant presence increases, elite conservative Protestant influence grows stronger, 
which results in policies and programs that do little to reduce divorce, but only increase 
early marriage” (Glass and Levchak 2014:1035). This idea suggests that, in these types of 
religious practices, early marriage is idealized, but the resources needed for improving 
marriage quality are either weak or considered unnecessary.  
Region: 
 Studying the variations in trends between regions can reveal insight into how the 
features of a given geographical location can affect social behavior. Explanations 
regarding the divorce rate among different states often require an understanding of the 
relationships between factors such as race, class, religion, and history. As previously 
stated, Glass and Levchak (2014) concluded that communities with high amounts of 
conservative Protestants actually have a higher divorce rate than others. While this 
finding cannot explain patterns of divorce in the South, it can signify the effects of 
community norms and Protestant teachings on location. As previously discussed, as 
concentrations of Protestant people became more pronounced, their values and teachings 
did as well (Glass and Levchak 2014). This statistic may therefore be a function of the 
compositions of communities and the perpetuation of certain beliefs. 
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 Effective dates of the no-fault divorce law reform may also have a regional effect 
on the divorce rate. Nakonezny et al. (1995) found a noticeable decrease in the divorce 
rate in Nevada after the adoption of no-fault divorce across the 50 states. Before no-fault 
divorce became an option, this study claims that Nevada “was a divorce mill where an 
expedient divorce was available to married couples in the United States” (Nakonezny et 
al. 1995:486). Once other states began accepting this reform, traveling to Nevada to 
obtain a divorce was no longer a requirement.  
 In another study, it was found that divorce rates generally increase in the United 
States going from East to West and from North to South (Fenelon 1971:326). This 
occurrence has been referred to as the effects of a “frontier atmosphere”, proposing that 
certain environments are more conducive to “individuality and freedom from traditional 
social restraints” (Fenelon 1971:326). Explanations for these findings are similar to those 
offered by Halem (1980), who suggested that certain societies and norms are more 
tolerant of divorce. However, given that this study took place in the early 1970s, its 
results may be outdated. 
 Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) found that couples living in metropolitan areas 
are significantly more likely to get divorced. These results may be due to the options 
available to urban women versus rural women. In urban environments, women are faced 
with more financial options, less of a stigma around divorce, and less search costs for 
finding a new partner (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996:61). Further, this study found that 
states with a higher percentage of Christian Fundamentalists have a significantly lower 
divorce rate (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996). Their finding, that states with a higher 
number of Baptists, Lutherans, Methodists, and Mormons have lower divorce rates, 
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indicates that divorce is influenced by community norms, which was similarly concluded 
by Glass and Levchak (2014) (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 1996:62). This is especially 
important to my study, since it examines the interaction between micro-level factors such 
as region and religion and how they work together to affect the divorce rate.  
 
Conclusions: 
 Starting in the mid 20th century, the divorce rate increased at a shockingly fast 
rate, yet has leveled off in recent years. By the year 1980, one in every two marriages 
would end in divorce and, by the end of the century, American marriages produced a rate 
of over one million divorces a year, a number that can be reduced to one divorce every 13 
seconds (Riley 1991:156). During the late 19th century and early 20th century, divorce 
was much less socially accepted, had financial repercussions, required the confirmation 
of fault, and was limited by the legal system (Cherlin 2009; Nakonezny et al. 1995; 
O’Neil 1967; Riley 1991; Vlosky et al. 2002; Weitzman 1985; Wheeler 1974; Wright and 
Stetson 1978 and Yenor 2011). A study of the macro-level causes for the divorce rate 
indicates a strong relationship between the ideological revolution during the 1960s, while 
the leveling out of divorce may be attributed to a period of relative social rest (Cherlin 
2009; Furstenberg 1994; Halem 1980; Herman 1992; Kent 1992; Morgan 1991; 
Nakonezny et al. 1995; O’Neil 1967; Riley 1991; Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006; 
Schwartz and Han 2014; Vlosky and Monroe 2002; Weitzman 1985; Wheeler 1974; 
Wright and Stetson 1978 and Yenor 2011). Ideological reform such as the shifted focus 
of society towards “the self” produced a change in life goals, potentially altering people’s 
motivations to get and stay married. Events such as the entrance of women into the 
workforce and the option of contraceptives have both provided support for some of the 
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ideas introduced by feminism. This increasing independence of women from their 
husbands may play a role in the willingness of women to get a divorce. Legal reform 
allowed people to get divorced without the customary necessity of finding fault, making 
the process of divorce much easier. Finally, a transformation in the values taught in 
certain religions, such as the emphasis on “the self”, occurred at around the same time 
that the divorce rate rapidly increased. Yet, the precise direction of this relationship is 
unknown. 
 In an attempt to identify the extent to which these ideologies affect the risk of 
divorce on the micro-level, I will conduct an analysis of literature and studies that have 
been published on these topics. The effects of social groups such as age at first marriage, 
race, education, income, religion, and region have revealed some intriguing patterns. 
However, I have found contradictory results within almost every category. Therefore, this 
study will aim to draw more definitive, causal connections between micro-level correlates 
and causes of divorce. Can features such as race and income predict divorce and to what 
extent do their explanations interact with one another? Are these relationships due to the 
ideologies that emerged during the 1960s, or are they attributable to trends within modern 
day society? It is my hope that this study will further define causal connections and 
contribute to the existing literature on the predictors of divorce.   
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Chapter 2: Methods 
 Having just explored the influences of macro-level factors on the divorce rate over 
the past few decades, it is now be the aim of this paper to draw more definitive 
conclusions regarding the effects of micro-level factors on the risk of divorce and how 
these factors have changed over time. My primary source for obtaining data was the 
General Social Survey. The GSS is a trend survey conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Center that measures and monitors societal change in the United States. The 
survey includes a “core” of demographic, behavioral and attitudinal questions, in addition 
to topics of special interest. Many of these measures have remained unchanged since the 
GSS first began in 1972, allowing time-trend studies as well as replications of other 
studies. The GSS is well known as “the single best source of data on societal trends” and 
contains 5,545 variables, time trends for 2,072 variables and 268 trends that have 20+ 
data points. This serves as a valuable tool for measuring variables such as demographics, 
opinions, and behaviors, since it covers a vast range of topics and includes consistent data 
for over 40 years (NORC. “The General Social Survey.” 
http://www3.norc.org/Gss+website/).  
Measuring Dependent Variables 
 To measure the rate of divorce, I used the variables “DIVORCE” and 
“MARITAL.” While neither of these variables solely measures the rate of marriages that 
end in divorce, they do measure whether respondents have ever been married and the 
number of respondents currently divorced or separated. “DIVORCE” is a nominal 
variable and asks respondents, “If currently married or widowed: Have you ever been 
divorced or legally separated?” “MARITAL” is also a nominal variable and asks 
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respondents, “Are you currently- married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you 
never been married?” In order to apply more directly to my study, the variables 
“DIVORCE” and “MARITAL” have been combined to create “Divorced.” This variable 
excludes respondents who are separated and includes respondents who have been 
divorced but are now remarried.  
Measuring Independent Variables 
Decades: 
 In order to measure changes in trends over time, I recoded the variable “decade” 
into four categories: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The 2000s includes surveys from 
2000 to 2012. Throughout each analysis, “seventies” is used as a comparison category.  
Demographic Variables 
 Independent variables were divided into four groups:  Religion, Demographics, 
Social Class, and Values and were chosen based on the consistency with which they were 
used since the start of the survey. To measure whether age at first marriage affects 
respondents’ risk of divorce, the variable “AGEWED” was recoded into two dummy 
variables, “Less than 21” (including respondents who got married when they were 21 or 
younger) and “Over 21” (including respondents who got married at age 22 or above). 
Less than 21 was used as the reference category throughout the study. To determine 
whether race has any effect on the risk of divorce, the variable “RACE” was recoded into 
three dummy variables, including “White”, “Black” and “Other.” White was used as the 
reference category, allowing me to measure the risk of divorce for participants in the 
“Black” and “Other” categories relative to white respondents. To measure educational 
attainment, the variable DEGREE was recoded into three groups, each representing 
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higher levels of education. “Less than High School”, “High School” and “Some College” 
permitted me to determine whether educational attainment has any effect on respondents’ 
risk of divorce, relative to those who have a high school degree, which was used as the 
reference category in this group. The variable REGION was recoded into nine dummy 
variables, each representing a different category. These dummy variables were then 
grouped into “North” and “South.” The Northern regions included New England, Middle 
Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Mountain and Pacific. The Southern 
regions included West South Central, East South Central, and South Atlantic. The 
Southern regions were used as the reference category, which allowed me to measure the 
risk of divorce for respondents in the Northern regions relative to those in the South. 
Religious Affiliation 
 Religious affiliation was measured by recoding the variables RELIG and 
DENOM into “Reltrad” (Steensland et al 2000). This variable included the categories: 
Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Other 
Religion and None. Each category was recoded into its own dummy variable and 
respondents with no religion were used as the reference category. Further, the variable 
ATTEND measured respondents’ religious activity by asking, “How often do you attend 
religious services?” and it was used to determine whether the amount of religious 
participation respondents took part in had an effect on the risk of divorce. Unlike many of 
the other variables, ATTEND is an ordinal level of measurement, so results were based 
on each additional level of reported religious attendance, with higher scores representing 
more frequent attendance. Frequencies tables for each of these variables are available in 
Table 2.1.  
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Social Class Variables 
 To determine whether respondents’ income affected their risk of divorce, I used 
the variable CONINC. Since the dollar has experienced so much inflation over the course 
of the past few decades, I chose CONINC because it is asked fairly consistently and 
because it controls inflation by measuring income in constant 2000 dollars. Given the fact 
that respondents have the option of choosing between almost thousands of categories for 
this variable, I recoded it into three separate groups, beginning with the minimum option, 
60384 in constant 2000 dollars and below (Low Income). The next group took that 
number and doubled it, making a Middle Income group (60384 to 120385). The final 
group consisted of respondents with High Incomes of 120386 and up. The group with the 
lowest income was used as the reference category in the regression model. CLASS, a 
variable that asks respondents their subjective class position, was recoded to include 
respondents who perceived themselves to be in the lower or working classes in one 
dummy variable and those who perceived themselves to be in the middle and upper 
classes as another dummy variable. Although the distribution was fairly split, I decided to 
use the lower/working class variable as the reference category.  
Values 
 Finally, one of the key points explored in the literature review was how traditional 
gender roles have changed over time. Thus, two variables that measure respondents’ 
views towards gender roles were used to determine whether these attitudes have an effect 
on divorce. FEFAM is an ordinal-level of measurement that asks respondents to state 
how strongly they agree with the following statement, “It is much better for everyone 
involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the 
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home and family”, with 1 being “strongly agree” and 4 being “strongly disagree.” This 
same scale is used to measure respondents’ views towards women’s entrance into the 
workforce with the variable FECHLD, which states, “A working mother can establish 
just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.” 
The literature review also discussed the acceptance of birth control and contraception in 
great detail. The variable PREMARSX asks respondents, “If a man and woman have sex 
relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong 
only sometimes, or not wrong at all?” Since each of these variables is an ordinal-level of 
measurement, the risk of divorce was determined based on each additional level that 
respondents reported.  
Analytic Strategy 
Trend Analysis 
 In order to get a sense of the trends and patterns that characterize America’s 
attitudes and actions towards divorce, the next chapter begins with the results of tests 
conducted on variables that measure changes in the marriage and divorce rates. Using 
cross tabulations, these variables include “MARITAL”, “DIVORCE”, and “Divorced.” 
Next, I used three variables that reflect changes in respondents’ attitudes regarding when 
they believe divorce is acceptable, how easy they believe it is to get a divorce, and 
whether obtaining a divorce should be more or less difficult. These variables include 
“DIVBEST”, “DIVNOW”, and “DIVLAW.” Finally, I used the independent variables 
included in the religion, demographics, social class, and values groups for the remainder 
of the study. Table 2.1 displays the general distribution of each of these variables.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Correlates of Divorce 
Variables Mean St. Deviation Mode  Text 
Demographics 
   Age at first marriage 
   
   AGEWED 22.15 4.89 21 
If ever married: How old were you when you 
first married? 
       Less than 21 0.54 0.5 1 Less than 21 Agewed dummy (yes=1, no=0) 
       Over 21 0.46 0.5 0 Over 21 Agewed dummy (yes=1, no=0) 
Race 
       RACE       What race do you consider yourself? 
       White 0.81 0.39 1 White race dummy (yes=1, other=0) 
       Black 0.14 0.35 0 Black race dummy (yes=1, other=0) 
       Other 0.05 0.22 0 Other race dummy (yes=1, other=0) 
Education 
       DEGREE 1.32 1.16 1 Respondent's highest degree 
       Less than High School 0.66 0.47 1 
Degree less than high school dummy (yes=1, 
no=0) 
       High School 0.07 0.25 0 Degree high school dummy (yes=1, no=0) 
       Some College 0.27 0.44 0 Degree some college dummy (yes=1, no=0) 
Region 
       REGION 
   
Region of interview 
       New England 0.05 0.21 0 
Region New England dummy (yes=1, 
other=0) 
       Middle Atlantic 0.15 0.36 0 
Region Middle Atlantic dummy (yes=1, 
other-0) 
       E. N. Central 0.19 0.39 0 
Region E. N. Central dummy (yes=1, other-
0) 
       W. N. Central 0.07 0.26 0 
Region W. N. Central dummy (yes=1, 
other=0) 
       S. Atlantic 0.19 0.39 0 Region S. Atlantic dummy (yes=1, other-0) 
       E. S. Central 0.07 0.25 0 
Region E. S. Central dummy (yes=1, 
other=0) 
       W. S. Central 0.09 0.29 0 
Region W. S. Central dummy (yes=1, 
other=0) 
       Mountain 0.06 0.24 0 Region Mountain dummy (yes=1, other=0) 
       Pacific 0.13 0.34 0 Region Pacific dummy (yes=1, other=0) 
           North 0.65 0.48 1 North region dummy (yes=1, no=0) 
           South 0.35 0.48 0 South region dummy (yes=1, no=0) 
Income 
       CONINC 44503.04 35936.01 39695 Family income in constant dollars 
       Low Income 0.76 0.43 1 
Family income less than 60384 in constant 
2000 dollars (yes=1, no=0) 
       Middle Income 0.19 0.39 0 
Family income from 60385 to 120385 in 
constant 2000 dollars (yes=1, no=0) 
       High Income 0.05 0.22 0 
Family income 120386 and up in constant 
2000 dollars (yes=1, no=0) 
   Class 2.46 0.66 2 Subjective class identification 
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       Lower/Working class 0.51 0.5 1 
Class lower or working dummy (yes=1, 
no=0) 
       Middle/Upper class 0.49 0.5 0 Class middle or upper dummy (yes=1, no=0) 
Religion 
       RELIG 
   
Respondent's religious identity 
   DENOM 
   
Specific denomination 
       Evangelical Protestant 0.19 0.4 0 
RELIG and DENOM Evangelical dummy 
(yes=1, other=0) 
       Mainline Protestant  0.24 0.42 0 
RELIG and DENOM Mainline dummy 
(yes=1, other=0) 
       Black Protestant 0.09 0.3 0 
RELIG and DENOM Black Protestant 
dummy (yes=1, other=0) 
       Catholic 0.29 0.45 0 
RELIG and DENOM Catholic dummy 
(yes=1, other=0) 
       Jewish 0.02 0.15 0 
RELIG and DENOM Jewish dummy (yes=1, 
other=0) 
       Other Religion 0.03 0.17 0 
RELIG and DENOM Other Faith dummy 
(yes=1, other=0) 
       None 0.13 0.33 0 
RELIG and DENOM non affiliated dummy 
(yes=1, other=0) 
   ATTEND 3.83 2.71 7 
How often respondent attends religious 
services 
     Values 
    Gender roles 
   
   FEFAM 2.67 0.86 3 
Better for man to work, women to stay home 
and take care of home and family 
   FECHLD 2.56 0.81 3 Mother working doesn't hurt child 
Premarital Sex 
      PREMARSX 2.77 1.25 4 Sex before marriage 
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. AGEWED, RACE, DEGREE, REGION, 
CONINC, CLASS, RELIG, DENOM, ATTEND, FEFAM, FECHLD, PREMARSX. 
 
Regressions 
 Next, regression models were used to measure the variable “divorced” with each 
group of independent variables. Given the fact that events such as the passing of no-fault 
divorce laws took place mostly in the 1970s, the variable “seventies” was used as the 
reference category. Each model features the slope (B), the standard deviation, and the 
odds ratio. Without the addition of any control variables, Model A (Table 3.1) displays 
the rate of divorce throughout each decade, relative to the 1970s, and was used as the 
baseline model throughout most of the study. 
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 Once the initial model was conducted, each dummy variable for religious 
identification was added as a covariate in the regression model. Since the category “No 
Religion” was left out, the regression analysis helped me determine what the risk of 
divorce was for each religious category, compared to respondents with no religion. For 
the first religion regression model, I left out the variable ATTEND in order to determine 
whether religious participation plays a role in the risk of divorce and whether this role 
varies between religious groups. The next model (Model C) incudes ATTEND and an 
analysis of the results between Models B and C determined whether participation matters 
for different religions in the overall risk of divorce. The purpose of introducing these 
control variables was to determine whether the slopes, odds ratios and significance 
numbers for the decades change. If they have, then I may conclude that respondents’ 
religious identification had an influence on the risk of divorce.  
 The same process was applied to the group “demographic variables” to determine 
whether certain demographic attributes have an effect on the risk of divorce. Unlike the 
religious affiliation group, this group includes a number of comparison categories. Age at 
first marriage was measured by comparing the risk of divorce for respondents that got 
married at age 22 and older, relative to those who got married at age 21 and under. The 
risk of divorce for categories “Black” and “Other” were measured against the category 
“White”, while differing levels of educational attainment were measured against the 
recoded middle group, respondents who have a high school degree. The effect of location 
on the risk of divorce was measured by using the southern regions as a comparison 
category. Social class variables represent the third group, and consist of income and 
perception of social class. The regression model with divorced, decades, and values did 
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not have any reference categories, since each variable is an ordinal-level of measurement. 
Thus, I was able to determine whether the risk of divorce increases or decreases with the 
strength of respondents’ reported opinions regarding gender roles and premarital sex.  
 Once the effects of each independent variable had been assessed, all four groups 
were combined in a full regression model. The purpose of adding every control variable 
was to identify how much each one contributed to the overall trend of divorce, once other 
factors had been accounted for. By comparing the slopes and odds ratios of these results 
to those of previous models, I was able to determine how each independent variable 
affected the risk of divorce, without worrying about spurious results. Results were 
significant if they differed from those in previous models, since this would have indicated 
a partial explanation of this variable from another control. Comparing the slopes, odds 
ratios and sigs for the decades in Models A and G (Table 3.6) helped to understand how 
these variables all work together to explain the trend of divorce. If the application of 
these controlled variables worked, then the slope of each decade will have approached 
zero and the Exp(B) will have approached one.  
 For this section, I used the equation:  
100  × 𝐵1− 𝐵2𝐵1  
This equation helped to determine how well the control variables explained the rate of 
divorce by measuring the change of the decade coefficient slopes both before and after 
the controls have been applied.  
Interaction Tests 
 The final analysis combined the variables in “decade” with each religion dummy 
and each value variable. The purpose of this was to determine whether the effects that 
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religion and values have on the risk of divorce have changed over time. Each dummy 
variable included in this interaction test was coded separately with each decade variable. 
Therefore, recoded variables included “eighties” and “Evangelical”, “nineties” and 
“Evangelical”, “twothousands” and “Evangelical”, etc. When conducting this interaction 
analysis, each main effect as well as the interaction effects were included. Variables prior 
to recoding served as the main effects, which were then compared to the recoded 
variables. Unlike with previous analyses, interaction results were analyzed based on 
associations only within that model. If a comparison between the main effect and the 
three recoded variables for that category displayed results that were statistically 
significant yet unchanged, then it can be said that this variable has continued to affect 
divorce in the same way through each decade. If interaction term results were statistically 
significant and yielded differing results across each variable, then I could conclude that 
the effects of this variable on the risk of divorce have changed over time. Finally, if 
results were statistically non-significant, then the effects of that variable on the risk of 
divorce have continued to be ineffective. This final analysis explored the main effects of 
religious affiliation and value on the risk of divorce, as well as how their effects have 
changed over time.  
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Chapter 3: Results 
 
 The events and ideologies discussed earlier present a period of pivotal change for 
American society. As values began to change, the divorce rate increased rapidly. This 
chapter begins with an examination of the changes in marriage and divorce patterns, 
using six measures from the General Social Survey that have been asked between the 
years 1972-2012. Although these variables were not asked frequently enough to be 
included in the final analysis, they provide helpful insight into the American population’s 
attitudes regarding divorce, right at the most crucial periods of time. Results support the 
idea that ideological and societal changes have had effects on the institutions of marriage 
and divorce, both in terms of the divorce rates and on attitudes regarding divorce. 
 The second part of this chapter attempts to assess the effects of independent 
variables on the risk of divorce. These variables have been organized into two groups: 
attributes, which includes categories for religion, demographics, and social class, and 
values, which includes variables that measure respondents’ attitudes regarding gender 
roles and premarital sex. First, I conducted regression models for each group of 
independent variables against both the divorce rate and also the decades. By analyzing 
the slope, sig, and odds ratio of each variable against the reference category, I was able to 
determine whether certain variables increase, decrease, or do not affect respondents’ risk 
of divorce, relative to that category. In the final model, each group of variables was 
combined in order to avoid spurious results. Finally, I computed a series of interaction 
variables by combining the categories for decades and religion and for decades and 
values, a total of 30 new variables. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the 
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ways that the effects of religion and values on the risk of divorce have changed over time, 
or if their effects have remained the same. 
Dependent Variables 
Divorce Variables 
Figure 3.1 What is your marital status? (1972-2012) 
 
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. MARITAL, “4. Are you currently- married, 
widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?” 
 
To begin, Figure 3.1 displays the overall pattern of American marriages from 1972 to 
2012. The typical American’s marital status has shifted substantially over the course of 
these forty years. Only two categories remain steady throughout the graph, “Widowed” 
and “Separated.” However, “Married”, “Divorced”, and “Never Married” all display 
substantial changes from the years 1972-2012. The most significant trend change is 
within the “Married” category. In 1972, 71.9% of respondents reported being married, yet 
that percentage drops to 53.9%, only slightly more than half of respondents, in 2012. This 
category also experiences the most sudden change, decreasing a total of 18.4% between 
the years 1974 and 1982. With only a few instances of variation, the “married” category 
continues to decrease after 2004, raising only 2% between the years 2010 and 2012. The 
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percent of respondents who reported never having been married jumped from 13% in 
1972 to 20.5% in 2012, with slight dips in 1983, 1993, and 2008; otherwise, this upward 
trend is fairly consistent. Respondents who reported being divorced also show an upward 
trend, having gone from only 4% in 1972 to 12.4% in 2012, with one significant dip in 
2008. These figures, however, may mask the prevalence of marital dissolution because 
they only show current marital status. 
Figure 3.2: Have you ever been divorced or separated? (1972-2012) 
 
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVORCE, “4b. If currently married or 
widowed: Have you ever been divorced or legally separated?” 
 
To assess the rate of divorce and remarriage, I examine the question of whether 
respondents have been divorced or separated in the past. As predicted, the rate of divorce 
has experienced a noticeable change. Both responses indicate similar trends, suggesting a 
slight increase in divorce or legal separation between the years 1972 to 2012. 
Respondents who reported having never been divorced or separated went from 85.5% in 
1972 to 75.2% in 2012, indicating a decrease of slightly lower than 10%. Similar findings 
are found with respondents who reported having been divorced or separated, going from 
14.5% in 1972 to 24.8% in 2012, an increase of slightly over 10%. These results 
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demonstrate a trend that, in terms of respondents who have been married, the number that 
get divorced or legally separated has increased while the number that do not has 
decreased. Although these results do support the original notion that the rate of divorce 
has gone up, they do not indicate quite as dramatic an increase as expected.  
Figure 3.3: Ever been divorced (may be remarried)? (1972-2012) 
 
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVORCED, “Ever been divorced (may be 
remarried)?” Recoded from MARITAL and DIVORCE. 
  
Although the previous variables measured divorce and marriage in the United States, the 
purpose of this study is to measure the rate of divorce for those respondents who have 
been legally divorced, not separated. The variable “Divorced” was recoded from the GSS 
variables “MARITAL” and “DIVORCE” for the purpose of identifying only the 
respondents whose marriages have ended due to divorce, including those who have 
gotten remarried. This graph indicates a fairly significant change in the rate of divorce 
between the years 1972 and 2012. Respondents who report having been divorced at one 
point goes from 15.7% in 1972 to 29.4% in 2012, an increase of 87%. At it’s maximum, 
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the rate of respondents who reported having had a divorce was 31% in 2006. The rate of 
divorce experiences minor decreases during the years 1974, 1989, 1992, and 2008, yet 
none represents a reversal of the trend. It does appear, however, that the rate has 
stabilized at around 30% from 1996 forward.  
Attitudes 
Figure 3.4: Divorce as best solution to marital problems (1994-2012) 
 
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVBEST, “1299. Do you agree or 
disagree…Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can’t seem to work out their 
marriage problems.” 
 
Much of the societal change that occurred in America had to do with ideology. Thus, it is 
important to measure not only the divorce rate, but also the degree to which people’s 
opinions towards divorce have changed over the years. As indicated in the graph above, 
each response shows at least a slight change over the course of the 28 years and 3 times 
the question was asked. The first option, “Strongly Agree”, went from 9.1% in 1994 to 
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13.6% in 2002 and then suddenly decreases to 7.2% in 2012. Respondents in the “Agree” 
category went from 39.4% in 1994, then decreased to 29.4% in 2002 and then 44.8% in 
2012, suggesting that respondents’ opinions rapidly changed. Also notable were the 
respondents that chose “Neither Agree Nor Disagree”, which went from 19.5% in 1994, 
to 20.3% in 2002 and 14.8% in 2012, suggesting that more respondents developed 
opinions on the matter. Significantly, opinions seem to level out between the years 1994 
and 2002, with the less popular options showing an increase and the most popular options 
showing a decrease. However, in 2012, each option appears farther apart than it was in 
1994.   
Figure 3.5: How easy is it to get a divorce today? (1988) 
            
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVNOW, “In general, would you say that 
the law makes is easy or difficult for people who want to get divorced?” 
 
Before the 1970s, obtaining a divorce in any state required the finding of fault, making 
the process a difficult one. By the 1980s, nearly every state had adopted more relaxed 
divorce laws. The typical American’s opinion on divorce laws, as indicated in Figure 3.5, 
demonstrates the belief that divorce has become legally much easier to obtain. Nearly 
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half of respondents believe that the law makes divorce very easy at 42.7%, whereas only 
3.9% of respondents believe that the law makes getting a divorce very difficult. 
Responses in between “Very Easy” and “Very Difficult” decrease at a steady rate, with 
the largest difference occurring between the options “Fairly Easy”, at 33.1%, and 
“Neither”, at 14.7%. 
Figure 3.6: Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than 
it is now?	  
	  
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. DIVLAW, “Should divorce in this country be 
easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now?” 
 
Changing the norms and laws that govern a society first requires a change in the attitudes 
of the people affected by these laws. Since the early 1970s, when the first no-fault 
divorce laws had been implemented in a few states, opinions regarding how easy it 
should be to obtain a divorce have remained relatively unchanged. The most dramatic 
change occurs in the “More Difficult” category, when results went from 50.7% in 1977 
down to 43.5% in 1978 and then back up to 50.3% in 1982. Further, the “More Difficult” 
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and “Easier” categories begin to merge, with a difference of 20.1% in 2006, and then a 
difference of only 5.8% in the year 2012. 
Independent Variables: The Macro and Micro-Level Correlates of Divorce 
 The graphs above display trends of changing attitudes and actions regarding 
divorce. In order to identify the ways in which micro-level factors interact to produce 
changes in divorce, I have used a number of independent variables that can be 
categorized into two groups: attributes and values. Attributes are further separated into 
religion, demographics, and social class. Religion includes each of the dummy variables 
recoded from the variable “Reltrad.” Demographics include age at first marriage, race, 
education, and region. Social class categories include CONINC and CLASS, a variable 
that asks respondents for their subjective social class position. These groups served the 
purpose of controls in the final model and to determine whether particular religions, 
demographics, social class variables, or values are more prone to divorce than others. A 
series of regression models were computed, beginning with a baseline model displaying 
the interaction between the divorce rate and decades. Then, each group of variables was 
separately added to Model A in order to determine how each one separately affects the 
overall risk of divorce. Next, each group of variables was combined into the same model 
to see how they interact to effect the divorce rate together, as well as how well this 
particular set of variables explain the trend of divorce. Finally, I created interaction terms 
that combine the variables “decade” and religion categories, then “decade” and values, 
for the purpose of determining how the effects of religion and traditional values have 
changed over time. 
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Decade 
 After conducting a series of logistic regression models, I am able to identify how 
the risk of divorce is influenced by different variables. Table 3.1 displays the risk of 
divorce throughout each decade, without controlling for other variables. The odds ratio 
(Exp(B)) for the Constant in this model explains how high a risk of divorce people were 
at during the 1970s, which is used as the comparison category throughout the model. For 
this model, all variables are statistically significant. Staring at 0.207, results indicate that 
in the 1970s, individuals faced a 20.7% risk of getting divorced. In subsequent decades, 
relative to the 1970s, people were 1.44 times or 44% more likely to get divorced in the 
1980s, 1.89 times (89%) more likely to get divorced in the 1990s, and 2 times or 100% 
more likely to get divorced in the 2000s. These findings indicate a rather large increase 
from the 1970s to the 1980s, and a steadily decreasing, yet positive nonetheless, increase 
in subsequent decades.  
Table 3.1: Regression Model for Decades 
          Model A  
 
                 B 
             
SE 
          
Exp(B) 
Constant -1.574*** 0.026 0.207 
Eighties 0.365*** 0.033 1.44 
Nineties 0.638*** 0.032 1.892 
Two Thousands 0.697*** 0.03 2.007 
Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally 
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
 
Religion 
 Table 3.2 explores the risk of getting divorced for various religions, in 
comparison to those with no religion. Model B shows that, relative to those identifying 
with no religion, Evangelical Protestants are 1.35 times or 35% more likely to get 
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divorced, and Mainline Protestants are 1.127 or 12% more likely to get divorced. The 
results of Black Protestantism and Other Religion are statistically non-significant, 
meaning that they have the same risk of getting divorced as those with no religion. Both 
Catholics and Jews produce statistically significant results for these categories. Relative 
to those with no religion, Catholics have a 25.8% decreased risk and Jews have a 25.7% 
decreased risk of divorce. 
 Once the effects of religion have been controlled for, we can compare the slopes 
and odds ratios for the decades between Models A and B. Although all of the results are 
statistically significant, there is very little change between those in Model A and those in 
Model B. Thus, controlling for religious groups in this model explains very little of the 
trend of divorce throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.  
 Model C shows the risk of divorce through these religious categories, yet with the 
addition of the variable ATTEND, which measures the level of respondents’ religious 
participation. Out of the six categories in this model, the first three indicate statistically 
significant increases in the risk of divorce. Similarly with the results of Model B, 
Evangelical Protestants are 1.89 times or 89% more likely to get divorced than those with 
no religion and Mainline Protestants are 1.46 times or 46% more likely to get divorced 
than those with no religion. The results of these categories in both Model B and Model C 
are statistically significant, yet the risk of divorce associated with these religious groups 
become stronger and the group gets bigger, even once participation has been controlled 
for. Although Black Protestantism does not produce statistically significant results in 
Model B, Model C shows that they are 1.49 times or 49% more likely to get divorced 
than those identifying with no religion. With the application of the variable ATTEND, 
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and categories “Jewish” and “Catholic” produce statistically non-significant results. 
Further, with a slope of -0.098 and an Exp(B) of -0.907, religious attendance (ATTEND) 
is negatively associated with the risk of getting divorced. With each additional level of 
religious participation that respondents report (or each additional day per week that they 
attend services), they are 9.3% less likely to get divorced than those that have no 
religious affiliation at all.  
 In order to determine whether controlling for ATTEND affects the risk of divorce, 
I compare the results of the decades in Model A to Model B and then Model A to Model 
C. As I mentioned before, the results of the first comparison suggest that controlling for 
religion has had very little effect in explaining the overall risk of divorce. Results for the 
second comparison, though increased in size, are fairly similar to those of the first. Thus, 
although ATTEND does not fully explain the trend of divorce throughout the decades, it 
does seem to have an effect on the risk of divorce among different religions.  
Table 3.2: Regression Model for Decades and Religious Affiliation 
                                  Model A                         Model B                         Model C 
	  	   B	   SE	   Exp(B)	   B	   SE	   Exp(B)	   B	   SE	   Exp(B)	  
Constant	   -­‐1.574	   0.026	   0.207	   -­‐1.632***	   0.041	   0.196	   (-­‐1.54)***	   0.041	   0.214	  
Eighties	   0.365***	   0.033	   1.44	   0.382***	   0.036	   1.465	   0.377***	   0.036	   1.458	  
Nineties	   0.638***	   0.032	   1.892	   0.671***	   0.036	   1.955	   0.658***	   0.036	   1.931	  
Two	  Thousands	   0.697***	   0.03	   2.007	   0.727***	   0.034	   2.068	   0.718***	   0.034	   2.05	  
Religion	  Variables	  
Evangelical	  Protestant	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.303***	   0.037	   1.354	   0.641***	   0.041	   1.898	  
Mainline	  Protestant	   	  	   	  	   0.12**	   0.037	   1.127	   0.382***	   0.039	   1.465	  
Black	  Protestant	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0.045	   0.045	   1.046	   0.402***	   0.048	   1.494	  
Catholic	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.299***	   0.037	   0.742	   0.011	   0.039	   1.011	  
Jewish	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.296***	   0.081	   0.743	   -­‐0.128	   0.082	   0.88	  
Other	  Religion	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.077	   0.068	   0.925	   0.152*	   0.069	   1.164	  
ATTEND	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   -­‐0.098***	   0.005	   0.907	  
Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally 
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s, No religion. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Demographics 
 Table 3.3 shows the risk of divorce associated with demographic variables such as 
age at first marriage, race, education and region. The first variable, recoded to represent 
respondents who got married at the age of 22 or above, shows strong, statistically 
significant, negative results. With a slope of -0.715 and an odds ratio of 0.489, I can say 
that respondents who got married at age 22 or above are 51% less likely to get divorced, 
relative to the respondents who got married at age 21 or below. The next category, race, 
displays statistically significant results for black respondents, but not for respondents of 
another race. Thus, relative to white respondents, the comparison category for this 
variable, black respondents are 1.28 times or 28% more likely to get divorced. Since the 
results in the category “Other Race” are not statistically significant, they have the same 
risk as white respondents to get divorced. Levels of educational attainment shows 
statistically significant results for respondents who have at least some college, yet 
statistically non-significant results for those who have less than high school. Therefore, 
relative to those who have a high school degree (the reference group for this variable), 
respondents who have at least some college are 21% less likely to get divorced. Finally, 
the category “region”, separating respondents into the north and south regions, yielded 
statistically non-significant results. 
 With these demographic variables controlled for, I can compare the slopes and 
odds ratios of the decades in Model A and Model D. In Model A, the odds ratio of the 
Constant was 0.207. The application of control variables such as age at first marriage, 
race, education, and region in Model D changes the likelihood of divorce to 0.337 in the 
1970s, a decrease of almost 13 percentage points. In the decades following, respondents 
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were 1.74 times or 74% more likely to get divorced in the 1980s, an increase of 30 
percentage points from Model A. These findings indicate that changes in population 
characteristics in the 1980s resulted in a lower divorce rate than would have been 
observed if the population had retained the same demographic profile as was observed in 
the 1970s. In the 1990s, respondents were 2.43 times (or 143%) more likely to get 
divorced than in the 1970s, an increase of 54%. Finally, respondents were 3.50 times or 
250% more likely to get divorced in the 2000s than in the 1970s, an increase of 161%. 
These results show how the risk of divorce has changed throughout the decades, once 
demographic variables have been introduced.  
Table 3.3: Regression Model for Decades and Demographic Variables 
                             Model A                                                               Model D 
  B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) 
Constant -1.574*** 0.026 0.207 -1.087*** 0.085 0.337 
Eighties 0.365*** 0.033 1.44 0.555*** 0.043 1.743 
Nineties 0.638*** 0.032 1.892 0.891*** 0.050 2.437 
Two Thousands 0.697*** 0.03 2.007 1.254*** 0.076 3.503 
Demographic 
Variables 
      Married 21+ 
   
-0.715*** 0.036 0.489 
Black 
   
0.249*** 0.055 1.283 
Other 
   
-0.23 0.12 0.795 
Less Than HS Degree 
   
-0.067 0.074 0.935 
Some College 
   
-0.24** 0.081 0.787 
North 
  
  -0.039 0.037 0.961 
       Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally 
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s, No religion. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
 
Social Class 
 Table 3.4 assesses the risk of divorce by using social class variables as the 
control. As we can see with the slope, each variable has produced statistically significant 
results. Income variables were computed using the GSS variable CONINC, first by 
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dividing the range into three separate groups, each increasing by the same amount. The 
reference category for this group is Lower Income, which includes respondents with an 
income of less than 60384 in inflation-adjusted constant 2000 dollars. Model E shows 
that, relative to that group, respondents with an income from 60385 to 120385 have 25% 
less of a risk of divorce. Further, respondents with an income of 120385 or above have 
28% less of a risk of getting divorced compared to those with the lowest income. Finally, 
a variable that represents respondents who perceive themselves as being in the middle 
and upper classes indicates 29% less of a chance of getting divorced, relative to those in 
the lower and working classes.   
 After income and social class variables have been controlled for, we may refer to 
the slopes and odds ratios of the decades in Model E. Similarly with the results of Model 
C, controlling for financial variables has very little effect on the risk of divorce 
throughout the decades. However, results for the 1970s, 80s, 90s, and 2000s all remain 
statistically significant and substantially similar to those before controls. 
Table 3.4: Regression Model for Decades and Social Class                                                                                     
                                                                      Model A                                            Model E 
  B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) 
Constant -1.574*** 0.026 0.207 -1.432*** 0.029 0.239 
Eighties 0.365*** 0.033 1.44 0.374*** 0.035 1.453 
Nineties 0.638*** 0.032 1.892 0.652*** 0.034 1.918 
Two Thousands 0.697*** 0.03 2.007 0.704*** 0.033 2.021 
Financial Variables 
      Middle Income 
   
-0.157*** 0.029 0.855 
Higher Income 
   
-0.188*** 0.05 0.829 
Middle/Upper class 
   
-0.175*** 0.022 0.839 
Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally 
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s, Income from 60384 and under in constant 2000 
dollars, Lower/Working Class. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Values 
 Finally, respondents’ attitudes regarding gender roles and premarital sex are 
applied in Model F. Since each of these variables is an ordinal-level of measurement, 
results increase or decrease with each additional level reported by respondents. The 
variable FEFAM, asking whether respondents agree that men should be the achiever 
outside of the home and women should take care of the home and children, produces 
statistically significant results. According to these outcomes, each additional level 
reported on FEFAM causes an 8.6% decrease in the risk of divorce. FECHLD, a variable 
that asks respondents whether they believe that children are negatively affected when 
mothers work outside of the home, does not result in statistically significant results. The 
variable PREMARSX, measuring the degree to which respondents believe that sex before 
marriage is wrong, has statistically significant, positive results. This means that, with 
each additional level reported on PREMARSX, from thinking that premarital sex is 
“Always Wrong” to “Almost Always Wrong” to “Sometimes Wrong” to “Not Wrong at 
All”, respondents are 1.175 times, or have a 17.5% higher risk of getting divorced.  
 Once these attitudinal measures have been controlled for, I can analyze the slopes 
and odds ratios between the decades in Models A and F. In Model F, each variable 
endures some change, most notably the one in the 2000s, having gone from a 100% 
increase in the risk of getting divorced in Model A to a 72% risk of getting divorced in 
Model F. Thus, some part of the overall rise in divorce may be attributable to shifts in 
respondents’ values.  
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Table 3.5: Regression Model for Decades and Values 
                                           Model A                                   Model F 
  B SE Exp(B)           B SE Exp(B) 
Constant -1.574*** 0.026 .207 -1.598*** .105 .202 
Eighties 0.365*** 0.033 1.44 .253** .076 1.288 
Nineties 0.638*** 0.032 1.892 .506*** .072 1.658 
Two Thousands 0.697*** 0.03 2.007 .544*** .072 1.723 
Traditional Values 
      FEFAM 
   
-.090*** .020 .914 
FECHLD 
   
-.028 .019 .973 
PREMARSX 
   
.161*** .013 1.175 
Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: ever been legally divorced? 
Control variable: decade 1970s, Income from 60384 and under in constant 2000 dollars, 
Lower/Working Class. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
 
Full Model 
 Finally, Model G shows the effects of each control applied to the risk of divorce. 
This first allows me to identify how these variables interact in respondents’ risk of getting 
divorced. In some cases, the application of a control may change the results of another 
variable, meaning that the control has accounted for some of the risk previously found for 
that variable. Second, this allows me to determine how well the combination of these 
variables explains the overall trend of divorce that is found throughout the decades. 
Results indicate that, once every variable has been controlled for, respondents’ religious 
affiliation continues to have statistically significant effects. Relative to respondents with 
no religion, Evangelical Protestants have 1.763 times (or 76.3%) higher a risk of divorce 
than those with no religion, a decrease of 5% when compared to the risk of Evangelicals 
without the application of these variables (Model C). Mainline Protestants have 1.516 
times (or 51.6%) higher a risk than those with no religion, which is actually in increase 
from the results found in Model C. Although not as statistically significant as 
Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants have 1.513 times (or 51.3%) an 
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increased risk of getting divorced than those with no religion. Respondents identifying 
with Catholicism, Judaism, and other religions produce statistically non-significant 
results, meaning that the significant results found in Model B have been controlled for, 
similarly with those in Model C. The variable ATTEND produces statistically significant 
results, with each additional level of religious attendance, respondents are about 7% less 
likely to get divorced than those with less religious attendance.  
 The next group shows the effects of demographic variables on divorce and with 
the application of control variables. Relative to white respondents, black respondents 
have 24.6% decreased risk of getting divorced after other variables have been controlled 
for. In Model D, before other variables are controlled for, black respondents have 1.283 
times (or 28.3%) increased risk of getting divorced compared to white respondents, 
indicating a significant change from the results of Model D to Model G. The category 
“Other” in Model G shows a change of about 15% and, unlike in Model D, statistically 
significant results. Compared to Model D, respondents with less than a high school 
degree have a statistically non-significant risk of getting divorced, yet the variable “Some 
College” continued to produce statistically significant results and thus implies a 
relationship with divorce. Most notably, respondents living in the North region produced 
statistically significant results, unlike those in Model D. Compared to respondents living 
in the South region of the United States, respondents living in the North have a 17% 
decreased risk of getting divorced. 
 Variables measuring respondents’ social class show statistically non-significant 
results for both groups of income. Thus, the introduction of other controls reveals that 
income does not have a strong effect on respondents’ risk of divorce. Results of 
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respondents perceiving themselves to be in the middle or upper classes continue to be 
statistically significant and maintain the same odds ratio value, indicating a robust 
relationship. 
 Finally, variables measuring respondents’ attitudes on gender roles and premarital 
sex indicate some minor changes when introduced to other controls. FEFAM produces 
statistically significant results, and they remain relatively unaffected by the addition of 
other controls. The variables FECHLD produces statistically significant results, unlike in 
Model E, yet only changes by about 2%. Finally, the variable PREMARSX produces 
statistically significant results and is not affected by the introduction of other controls. 
Since the variables FEFAM and PREMARSX yield statistically significant results both 
before and after the introduction of controls, their relationship with divorce is not 
spurious.  
 To examine how the risk of divorce has changed throughout the course of the past 
four decades, I compare the slopes and odds ratios of the decades in Models A and G. 
With the introduction of these controls, the risk of divorce goes from 97% decreased to 
73.7% decreased, both of which are statistically significant. Compared to the 1970s, the 
1980s show an unaltered risk of divorce, meaning that the introduction of these variables 
has done little to explain the trend of divorce in this decade. In the 1990s, respondents 
had a 99% increased chance of getting divorced relative to the 1970s, a slight increase 
with the addition of the control variables. Finally, in the 2000s, respondents had 2.139 
times (or 113.9%) higher a risk of divorced than in the 1970s, another modest increase 
with the application of these variables. Thus, in terms of explaining why America’s 
divorce rate has risen since the 1970s, the combination of demographics, religion, 
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economic and attitudinal variables examined here suggest that the rise is due to some 
other, unstudied variable. Although these variables cannot explain the trend of divorce on 
the societal level, macro-level variables set the groundwork for an ideological revolution 
and micro-level variables help represent the populations that are most affected by 
divorce.  
Table 3.6: Regression Model for Decades, Religious Affiliation, Demographic 
Variables, Social Class, and Values  
                                                                    Model A                                     Model G 
  B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) 
Constant -1.5740*** 0.026 0.207 -1.334*** 0.182 0.263 
Eighties 0.365*** 0.033 1.44 0.377** 0.110 1.457 
Nineties 0.638*** 0.032 1.892 0.692*** 0.105 1.997 
Two Thousands 0.697*** 0.03 2.007 0.761*** 0.104 2.139 
Religious Identification 
   
      
Evangelical Protestant 
  
  0.567*** 0.073 1.763 
Mainline Protestant 
  
  0.416*** 0.067 1.516 
Black Protestant 
  
  0.414** 0.124 1.513 
Catholic 
  
  0.049 0.067 1.050 
Jewish 
  
  0.042 0.134 1.043 
Other Religion 
  
  0.148 0.116 1.159 
ATTEND 
  
  -0.066*** 0.009 0.936 
Demographic Variables 
  
        
Black 
  
  -0.282** 0.098 0.754 
Other 
  
  -0.477*** 0.096 0.621 
Less Than High School 
  
  -0.133 0.069 0.875 
Some College 
  
  -0.340*** 0.076 0.712 
North 
  
  -0.186*** 0.042 0.830 
Financial Variables 
  
        
Middle Income 
  
  -0.057 0.049 0.944 
Higher Income 
  
  -0.066 0.077 0.936 
Middle/Upper class 
  
  -0.149*** 0.042 0.862 
Traditional Values 
  
        
FEFAM 
  
  -0.049*** 0.025 0.952 
FECHLD 
  
  -0.098* 0.027 0.907 
PREMARSX 
  
  0.168*** 0.020 1.183 
Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: every been legally 
divorced? Control variable: decade 1970s, no religion, white race, high school degree, south 
region, Income from 60384 and under in constant 2000 dollars, Lower/Working Class. *p<.05. 
**p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Interaction Variables 
Decades and Religion 
 In order to further understand the relationship between these variables and the risk 
of divorce in America, I create interaction terms for each group of attributes and values 
with the decades. Out of each group of interaction term combinations, the results for 
religion and decades and for values and decades are the most significant. Thus, it can be 
said that the effects of demographics and social class variables on the risk of divorce have 
remained largely unchanged over the years. Model H displays the interaction effects 
between religion and decades and Model I includes the interaction effects of the variable 
ATTEND. Next, Model J displays the interaction effects between values and decades. In 
order to better understand the effects of the ideological revolution and provide a more 
thorough analysis of the interaction term results in Model J, Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 
feature cross-tabulations of FEFAM, FECHLD, and PREMARSX. I will first discuss 
interaction term results between religion and decades without ATTEND.  
 In the 1970s, the risk of divorce without the effects of religion or values put 
respondents at a 21.9% risk of divorce. In subsequent years, the risk of divorce increases, 
with 1.517 (or 51.7%) higher a risk of divorce in the 1980s. The risk increases in the 
1990s, with a 1.86 (or 86%) risk compared to the 1970s. Finally, the risk decreases 
significantly, with 1.685 times (or 68.5%) the risk of divorce in the 2000s.  
 According to the main effects in this model, only respondents in the Catholic and 
Jewish categories produce statistically significant results. Therefore, relative to those with 
no religion, Catholics and Jews have an overall decreased risk of divorce and all other 
categories have about the same risk of divorce. The interaction variables in Model H 
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indicate statistically non-significant results for each category in the 1980s, meaning that 
the effects of religion remained completely unchanged during this decade. The same is 
true for the interaction variables combined with the 1990s, with the exception of Black 
Protestants. Although it is statistically non-significant in the main effect, the effects of 
Black Protestantism increase the risk of divorce for participants by nearly 1.5 times. 
Relative to the 1970s, the effects of Black Protestantism in the 1980s not only diminish 
the risk of divorce but actually reverse it, suggesting that the protective effects of Black 
Protestantism gain strength form one decade to the next. Finally, the interaction results 
between the variables Evangelical Protestant and two thousands, Mainline Protestant and 
two thousands, Catholic and two thousands, and Jewish and two thousands produce 
statistically significant results. First, this means that the effects of each religion on 
divorce, while remaining unchanged in prior decades, do change in the 2000s. Relative to 
the 1970s, the protective effects of Evangelical Protestantism have lessened and the risk 
of divorce increases slightly. Further, respondents identifying with Mainline 
Protestantism, while they previously had a significantly reduced risk of divorce relative 
to those with no religion, actually have an increased risk of divorce in the 2000s. Thus, 
the effects of Mainline Protestantism have been greatly reduced and the risk of divorce is 
increased. Both the Catholic and Jewish categories have statistically significant results for 
the main effect, yet, as previously mentioned, only produce significant results when 
combined with the two thousands. Similarly with Mainline Protestants, the protective 
features of Catholicism and Judaism that initially prevented these religions from getting 
divorced is demolished and, relative to those with no religion, Catholics and Jews 
actually have greatly increased risk of getting divorced in the 2000s. The interaction 
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terms between other religions and decade produce no statistically significant results. 
Thus, the effects of other religions on the risk of divorce have remained completely 
unchanged in subsequent decades.  
 Model I displays the results of these same interaction terms, with the addition of 
the variable ATTEND, which measures respondents’ religious activity. In other words, 
adding this variable takes out the effect of participation and focuses primarily on the 
effects of affiliation. Although very few of these results are statistically significant, 
controlling for religious participation changes the direction of the interaction term results 
in nearly every case besides Jewish, making the protective effects of affiliation with these 
religions groups continue (unchanged, since they are statistically non-significant) to 
reduce the risk of divorce. This finding suggests that the sole effect of affiliation for 
Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, Catholics, and other 
religions has caused respondents a reduced risk of divorce in the past and that this 
relationship remains unchanged. However, the interaction term results for Judaism 
produce quite different results once religious participation has been controlled for. 
Relative to those with no religion, Judaism’s main effect appears to reduce respondents’ 
risk of divorce by about half. But, once religious participation is controlled for, the 
direction of the relationship changes. Therefore, I can conclude that, even when religious 
participation is controlled for, the protective effects of Judaism in the 1970s have been 
greatly reduced in subsequent years.    
 The pattern that was initially found in the combination of religious categories and 
the two thousands disappears when religious participation is controlled for, suggesting 
that the relationship between divorce and religion is due to respondents’ religious 
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activity. However, the results for Black Protestant and Jewish stand out in Model I. Since 
both sets of results are negative for Black Protestants, I conclude that the effects of 
affiliation and participation both reduce the risk of divorce. However, results become 
increasingly significant for Black Protestants in Model I, implying that, relative to those 
with no religion, the effects of affiliation with Black Protestantism on the risk of divorce 
have gotten increasingly strong over time. Further, in each other case, controlling for 
participation in Model I caused the direction of the relationship between divorce and 
religion to become negative. This is not the case for the Jewish category, which maintains 
nearly the exact positive correlation as was found before this control, suggesting that 
these results are legitimate. 
 To determine whether the addition of ATTEND has significant effects on 
respondents’ risk of divorce, I examine the results of Model H and Model I. First, a 
comparison between the decade coefficients shows that, while only slight, the addition of 
ATTEND has explained the divorce rate to some degree. The slope of each decade in 
Model H slightly decreases in Model I, while the Exp(B) gets slightly closer to a value of 
1 in Model I. Further, the addition of ATTEND significantly changes the results found 
across most religious groups, suggesting that religious participation plays a role in the 
risk of divorce.  
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Table 3.7: Interaction Regression Model Between Decades and Religious Affiliation 
                                                            Model H                                  Model I 
 
B Sig Exp(B) B Sig Exp(B) 
Main Effect 
   Decades 
       Constant -1.52*** 0.000 0.219 -1.420*** 0.000 0.242 
       Eighties 0.417** 0.001 1.517 0.402*** 0.001 1.495 
       Nineties 0.621*** 0.00 1.86 0.601*** 0.000 1.824 
       Two Thousands 0.522*** 0.00 1.685 0.499*** 0.000 1.647 
    
   Religious Variables 
       Evangelical Protestant 0.135 0.246 1.144 0.594*** 0.000 1.811 
       Mainline Protestant -0.023 0.832 0.977 0.362** 0.002 1.436 
       Black Protestant 0.232 0.068 1.261 0.738*** 0.000 2.091 
       Catholic -0.491*** 0.00 0.612 0.004 0.971 1.004 
       Jewish -0.81** 0.001 0.445 -0.595* 0.015 0.551 
       Other Religion 0.161 0.495 1.175 0.497* 0.039 1.644 
       ATTEND       -0.136*** 0.000 0.873 
 
Interaction Variables 
   EightiesXEvangelical Protestant 0.002 0.986 1.002 -0.091 0.556 0.913 
   NinetiesXEvangelical Protestant 0.071 0.606 1.073 -0.094 0.525 0.910 
   TwothousandsXEvangelical Protestant 0.324* 0.012 1.383 0.173 0.212 1.189 
 
   EightiesXMainline Protestant -0.125 0.366 0.882 -0.217 0.137 0.805 
   NinetiesXMainline Protestant 0.118 0.372 1.125 -0.044 0.756 0.957 
   TwothousandsXMainline Protestant 0.315* 0.01 1.37 0.160 0.219 1.173 
 
   EightiesXBlack Protestant -0.259 0.103 0.772 -0.378* 0.026 0.685 
   NinetiesXBlack Protestant -0.335* 0.033 0.715 -0.524** 0.002 0.592 
   TwothousandsXBlack Protestant -0.249 0.09 0.78 -0.437** 0.005 0.646 
 
   EightiesXCatholic 0.08 0.572 1.084 -0.038 0.803 0.963 
   NinetiesXCatholic 0.14 0.303 1.15 -0.083 0.572 0.921 
   TwothousandsXCatholic 0.284* 0.025 1.329 0.031 0.818 1.032 
   
   EightiesXJewish 0.378 0.205 1.459 0.372 0.215 1.451 
   NinetiesXJewish 0.503 0.082 1.654 0.458 0.117 1.581 
   TwothousandsXJewish 0.709* 0.01 2.032 0.626* 0.025 1.871 
    
   EightiesXOther Religion -0.255 0.374 0.775 -0.292 0.317 0.746 
   NinetiesXOther Religion -0.395 0.141 0.674 -0.517 0.059 0.596 
   TwothousandsXOther Religion -0.189 0.463 0.828 -0.349 0.184 0.706 
    
   EightiesXATTEND 
   
0.029 0.060 1.029 
   NinetiesXATTEND 
   
0.048*** 0.001 1.049 
   TwothousandsXATTEND 
   
0.052*** 0.000 1.053 
Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: ever been legally divorced? 
Excluded category/comparison group: decade 1970s, no religion. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Decades and Values 
 In order to fully express the strength of this ideological revolution, I conduct 
cross-tabulations between the years and FEFAM, FECHLD, and PREMARSX. Figures 
3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 display the results of these cross-tabulations. To summarize, in 1972, 
65.8% of respondents agreed that it was better for men to work and women to stay at 
home. Forty years later, only 40.5% of respondents agreed with this statement. Similarly, 
49% of respondents agreed that working mothers do not hurt children in 1972, whereas 
65.5% agreed with this statement in 2012. Finally, in 1972, 48.4% of respondents 
believed that sex before marriage was either “Always Wrong” or “Almost Always 
Wrong”, while only 27.5% of respondents reported this in 2012. Clearly, the distributions 
of results for these three variables have been greatly changed over the years. 
Figure 3.7: Cross Tabulation of Year and FEFAM 
 
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. FEFAM, “It is much better for everyone 
involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and 
family.” 
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Figure 3.8: Cross Tabulation of Year and FECHLD  
 
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. FECHLD, “A working mother can establish 
just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.” 
 
Figure 3.9: Cross Tabulation of Year and PREMARSX 
 
Notes: General Social Survey for years 1972-2012. PREMARSX, “If a man and woman have sex 
relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only 
sometimes, or not wrong at all?” 
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 Since the 1970s, the distributions of respondents’ attitudes regarding gender roles 
and premarital sex have changed immensely (Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9). Table 3.8 displays 
the effects of these views on the risk of divorce over the years. In the sig column, it is 
clear that, although there may have been some sort of ideological revolution over the 
course of the past forty years, the effects that respondents’ attitudes have on the risk of 
divorce has remained completely unchanged.  
Table 3.8: Interaction Regression Model Between Decades and FEFAM, FECHLD, 
and PREMARSX 
Model J 
 
   B Sig. Exp(B) 
Main Effects 
   Decade 
       Constant -1.594*** 0.00 0.203 
       Eighties 0.243 0.563 1.276 
       Nineties 0.44 0.271 1.552 
       Two Thousands 0.604 0.124 1.829 
   Views 
       FEFAM -0.081 0.393 0.922 
       FECHLD -0.094 0.233 0.91 
       PREMARSX 0.211 0.00 1.235 
 
View Interactions 
   EightiesXFEFAM 0.021 0.846 1.021 
   NinetiesXFEFAM -0.037 0.716 0.964 
   TwothousandsXFEFAM -0.004 0.971 0.996 
 
   EightiesXFECHLD 0.001 0.991 1.001 
   NinetiesXFECHLD 0.074 0.382 1.077 
   TwothousandsXFECHLD 0.1 0.232 1.106 
 
   EightiesXPREMARSX -0.025 0.698 0.975 
   NinetiesXPREMARSX -0.009 0.885 0.991 
   TwothousandsXPREMARSX -0.101 0.1 0.904 
Note: GSS for 1972-2012. Dependent variable: If ever been married: ever been legally divorced? 
Excluded category/comparison group: decade 1970s. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 The purpose of this study has first been to identify the social influences present 
during this ideological revolution, and further, whether they contributed to the rise in the 
divorce rate. Second, the study has attempted to draw more definitive conclusions 
regarding the role of micro-level factors in the risk of divorce. Using a number of 
variables from the GSS, a trend survey that measures and monitors societal change in the 
United States, I studied the effects of micro-level factors such as age at first marriage, 
race, education and region on the risk of divorce, both at the time of the revolution and 
present-day.  
 My research focused on social trends that took place from about the 1960s to 
present day. The effects that ideological changes had on behavior and values opposed 
traditional notions of the family, and ultimately lead to an increase in the divorce rate. 
Influences such as the growing emphasis on “the self”, the entrance of women into the 
workforce, the availability of birth control and contraception, transformed religious 
teachings, and the option of no-fault divorce laws have all theoretically played a part in 
the acceptance of divorce in America. 
 After conducting a number of tests on the effects of micro-level variables on the 
risk of divorce, I found that, when applied separately, factors such as religion, age at first 
marriage, race, education, social class, region, and values influence the individual’s risk 
of divorce. However, many of these correlations became non-significant once other 
controls were applied. To get a sense of how these effects have changed over time, I 
created interaction variables that combine decades with religion and with values. Results 
indicated that the effects of religion variables such as Black Protestantism, Judaism, and 
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the level of religious participation on the risk of divorce have changed over the course of 
the past few decades. Further, while respondents’ attitudes regarding gender roles and 
premarital sex have had effects on the risk of divorce, their influences have remained 
relatively unchanged over time. Analyses revealed that, while these variables produce 
intriguing results and suggest areas for future study, they are unable to fully explain the 
trend of divorce.  
The Start of an Ideological Revolution 
 Over the course of the past few centuries, the world has experienced many 
changes within the social sphere, including those of ideologies, values, and norms. 
Accompanying these changes was the emergence of an entirely new mindset, one that 
embodied the values of individualism and modernization. Yet these advancements also 
brought developments such as a rise in the divorce rate and a change in the institution of 
marriage all together. In a time of complete social upheaval, the 1960s brought about a 
new way of thinking that emphasized the importance of the individual, placing personal 
importance over that of the family (Cherlin 2009). Events and ideas such as women’s 
entrance into the workforce, the growing acceptance of birth control and contraception, 
the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, and the transformation of religious teachings can 
be credited for having some degree of influence in the rate of divorce (O’Neil 1967; 
Wheeler 1974; Wright and Stetson 1978; Halem 1980; Weitzman 1985; Riley 1991; 
Morgan 1991; Herman 1992; Kent 1992; Furstenberg 1994; Nakonezny et al. 1995; 
Vlosky and Monroe 2002; Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006; Cherlin 2009; Yenor 2011; 
Schwartz and Han 2014). The institution of marriage began to shift from the strict, 
traditional American ideal that it had embodied for generations, into a less restrictive, 
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accepting ideology that rejected divorce far less than before. Yet, these macro-level 
factors cannot take full credit for the rate of divorce; in order to fully understand the 
divorce revolution on both a societal and an individual level, we must identify how 
micro-level factors such as religion, age at first marriage, race, education, region, social 
class, and values affected the risk of divorce, both at that time and also today. Previous 
literature on the relationships between these variables and divorce has been inconclusive. 
Data Gathering/Analysis 
 By conducting frequencies, cross tabulations, regression models, and interaction 
terms on variables from the General Social Survey that measure the micro-level factors 
mentioned earlier, I attempted to measure the degree to which each variable helps explain 
the risk of divorce since the 1970s. After the initial analysis of decades and the rate of 
divorce, a number of control groups were added in. First, they were applied separately for 
the purpose of examining how variables affect divorce independently. Then, they were 
combined into the same model in order to regulate spurious results and to determine how 
each variable interacts with controls to explain the overall trend of divorce. Finally, each 
religion category and each value variable were combined with the decades, allowing me 
to identify how the overall effects of these variables on the risk of divorce have changed 
over time.  
Micro-Level Effects on an Individual’s Risk of Divorce 
The Rise of Divorce Across the Decades 
 Having just identified some of the main events and ideas that influenced the initial 
rise in the divorce rate, I categorize variables that I believe represent these changes on a 
social level, such as respondents’ opinions on whether obtaining a divorce should be 
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easier, more difficult or stay the same as it is now (DIVLAW). Figures 3.1 through 3.6 
display the patterns associated with divorce, including variables that measure both the 
divorce rate and also certain attitudes regarding divorce. Although many of these 
variables are not asked consistently enough to be included in the final analysis, they 
reflect changes in respondents’ opinions towards divorce throughout different, key points 
in time. In general, they reveal respondents’ increasingly relaxed attitudes towards the 
institution of marriage. The variable MARITAL indicates an increase in the overall 
number of respondents who choose not to get married, while the variable “divorced” 
shows, among respondents that have been married at one point, a steady increase in the 
rate of divorce. Attitudinal measures indicate that respondents generally see divorce as 
the best, easiest solution to solve marital problems.  
 Further, I identified twelve independent variables that are later measured against 
“divorced” and the decades, first separately and then all together. Used as the baseline 
model throughout most of the study, Table 3.1 includes only the recoded variable 
“decades” and displays the risk of divorce from one decade to the next. As has been 
commented on in numerous studies about marriage patterns, the rate of divorce increased 
by nearly 50% from the 1970s to the 1980s, 89% from the 1970s to the 1990s, and 100% 
into the 2000s. This sharp increase into the 1980s may be due, as the historical overview 
in Chapter 1 indicates, to the implementation of no-fault divorce laws in most states 
(Wright and Stetson 1978; Nakonezny et al. 1995; Vlosky and Monroe 2002). Although 
it is commonly believed that the divorce rate continues to increase, it has actually leveled 
off in recent years (Shoen and Canudas-Romo 2006:753). This fact can be explained 
through Schwartz and Han’s (2014) diffusion theory. While the rate of divorce was 
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relatively steady up until about mid-century, the ideological and social changes 
previously mentioned caused acceptance to increase, eventually reaching a “critical 
mass” (Schwartz and Han 2014:62). Once this mass had been reached, the acceptance of 
divorce sped up and the divorce rate skyrocketed. However, once the ideas that had 
initially caused people to get divorced became more widely accepted, such as women’s 
entrance into the workforce, the conflict that originally led to divorce lessened and thus, 
the divorce rate did as well.  
The Ideological Revolution’s Effects on Individual-Level Attributes  
The Effects of Religion on Divorce 
 In order to measure the risk of divorce on the individual level, variables were 
analyzed throughout five different models, the first four measuring the effects of religion, 
demographics, finances and values on divorce separately, and the fifth combining each 
variable together. Table 3.2 includes “divorced”, the decades, respondents’ religious 
identification, and participation. Model A displays the results of the baseline model and 
includes only the decades; Model B shows the results of the decades with each of the six 
categories for religion, leaving out “None” for the purpose of using it as the reference 
category; Model C shows the results of the decades, each category for religion, and the 
variable ATTEND, which measures the level of respondents’ religious activity.  
 Model B shows that, compared to those with no religion, respondents identifying 
with Evangelical Protestantism, Mainline Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism all 
produce statistically significant results, whereas respondents identifying with Black 
Protestantism and other religions do not. Since the results of the first two categories, 
Evangelical and Mainline, have positive slopes, they contradict what many may believe, 
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that more religious people are less likely to get divorced. Although a definitive analysis 
cannot yet be made, these results fall into line with the ideas introduced by Cherlin 
(2009), that many churches transformed their conservative teachings in order to 
accommodate the rising number of members seeking a divorce. In addition, respondents 
affiliating with more fundamentalist religious groups may get married earlier, a factor 
that has been associated with a higher risk of divorce (Kposowa 1998; Glass and Levchak 
2014). Glass and Levchak (2014) found that highly conservative Protestant communities 
have an increased risk of divorce. Potential explanations include the fact that they get 
married at younger ages and are given fewer resources to improve marriage quality later 
in life. 
 In order to determine whether the variable ATTEND plays a significant role in the 
risk of divorce, I added it as an additional coefficient in Model C. Controlling for 
religious participation causes the results to be largely based on affiliation alone. With the 
application of ATTEND, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants and Black 
Protestants all produce statistically significant results. The effect that the participation 
control has on Evangelical Protestants and Mainline Protestants is the same, yet the size 
of the group becomes bigger. In other words, the effect of religion on the risk of divorce 
is stronger once I account for levels of participation. Since Black Protestantism had 
statistically non-significant results in Model B, this change suggests that their increased 
risk of divorce is due to the higher amount of religious involvement that they have, 
relative to the non-religious people that they are being compared to. Although they yield 
opposite results than those of Black Protestants, similar conclusions can be drawn for the 
categories Catholic and Jewish. Since their results become statistically non-significant 
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with the application of ATTEND, it is possible that the risk of divorce for these two 
groups is not due to their actual religion, but instead to religious activity. Before the 
variable ATTEND is introduced, both Catholics and Jews have statistically significant, 
negative results, meaning that they have a decreased chance of getting divorced. 
However, since Model C shows statistically non-significant results for these categories, I 
can say that controlling for religious activity explains much of the relationship found in 
Model B.  
The Effects of Demographic Variables on Divorce 
 When controls for age at first marriage are introduced in Table 3.3, the results 
indicate a strong negative relationship between respondents who get married after the age 
of 21 and the risk of divorce, results which support Glass and Levchak’s (2014) recently 
discussed theory. Although this variable was not asked consistently enough to be 
included in the full model described later on, these results not only contribute 
significantly to the limited body of research previously done on this topic but they also 
agree with the results found in other studies, that younger couples have a higher risk of 
divorce. Although each control variable does not yield statistically significant results, a 
comparison of the odds ratios between each decade coefficient in Models A and D show 
that, if the distribution of these attributes had remained the same in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s as they were in the 1970s, then the divorce rate would have risen even more 
substantially. As displayed in Table 3.3, the application of these controls causes the 
likelihood of divorce to increases by as much as 161% in 2000. This therefore suggests 
that changes in population characteristics from the 1970s into subsequent decades have 
resulted in a muted increase in the divorce rate.  
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The Effects of Social Class Variables on Divorce 
 The next group of independent variables is social class, which is represented with 
three recoded levels of income and with respondents’ perceptions of their own social 
class position. Relative to respondents in the lowest group of income, those in the middle 
and upper groups both have at least a 25% reduced risk of divorce. This supports the 
hypothesis that Kposowa (1998) gives, that the reduction of financial stress in a family 
lessens conflict and marital breakdown. The perception of higher class also has an effect 
on the risk of divorce, as can be seen in Table 3.4. Although this finding was not 
specifically addressed in Kposowa’s study, the fact that respondents perceive themselves 
as being in a higher class may have an effect on their risk of divorce. This suggests that 
income may in fact be related to divorce, but a definitive conclusion cannot yet be made. 
The Continued Alignment of Traditional Values 
 Although variables measuring respondents’ attitudes on the topics mentioned in 
the literature review were limited, the available ones reveal significant trends (Table 3.5). 
As expected, FEFAM, the variable asking respondents whether they agree that women 
should leave controlling the country up to men, is highly correlated with a decrease in the 
risk of divorce. Traditional values like FEFAM maintain that woman should stay in the 
house and that men are responsible for providing for the family, a scenario that, once 
again, places women as the vulnerable, dependent party. However, definitive conclusions 
about this variable’s relationship with divorce cannot yet be made until it is added to the 
full model. 
 As I noted in the literature review, birth control and contraception have had 
significant effects on the ability of women to separate the act of sex from the 
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commitments of children and marriage (Yenor 2011). What had once been used by men 
as a weapon to secure the dependence of women is now seen as something far less 
obliging (Yenor 2011). The ability of women to control their reproduction has eliminated 
the binding nature of sex, and has become far more acceptable in recent decades. This 
liberated mindset does seem to have an effect on the risk of divorce, as seen with the 
variable PREMARSX in Table 3.5. With each additional level that respondents report on 
this variable, they face a 17.5% increased risk of getting divorced. Yet, similarly with the 
results of FEFAM, I cannot draw definitive conclusions until other variables have been 
controlled for.  
Explaining the Trend of Divorce In a Full Model 
Factors Associated With the Risk of Divorce 
 On an individual level, these micro-level results help me understand which 
attributes place people at a higher risk of divorce. Getting married before the age of 21 
may, as hypothesized in other works (Kposowa 1998; Glass and Levchak 2014), 
contribute to people’s risk of getting divorced, while Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) 
hypothesized that higher educational attainment decreases the risk of divorce. However, a 
definitive analysis must include the application of each control group to avoid spurious 
results. Table 3.6 displays the results of how these variables interact to affect the overall 
risk of divorce. Once variables are introduced to other controls, much of the data 
previously found to be statistically significant becomes non-significant.  
 With the introduction of other control variables, the results of religion remain the 
same. This suggests that the relationship previously discovered is not due to some third 
variable, and that Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants and Black Protestants are 
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actually at an overall increased risk of divorce, while respondents who attend religious 
activities more often are at a lower risk. These results support those found by Vaaler et al. 
(2009), that wives identifying with evangelical and fundamentalist groups are more 
willing to get divorced if their husbands disappoint them. The results of ATTEND also 
agree with what Mahoney (2010) and Vaaler et al. (2009) found, that, the more 
frequently people attend religious services or activities, the lower their overall risk of 
divorce. Among each of the religious groups mentioned earlier, Conservative Protestants 
have among the highest risk of divorce, relative to people with no religion. This finding 
coincides exactly with those of Glass and Levchak (2014), who found that Conservative 
Protestant communities have a higher risk than others to get divorced. This study later 
explained that this relationship may be due to other factors, yet since the results of my 
study control for other variables, we may conclude that this relationship may, in fact, be 
legitimate. This relationship may also help to explain the higher divorce rates found in 
Southern regions, since, as Glass and Levchak (2014) further suggest, the South contains 
a higher concentration of Protestants.  
 Unlike in Table 3.4, the results of income have no effect on the risk of divorce 
once all of the other controls are added to the equation. However, Kposowa’s theory 
(1998), that reduced financial stress results in less familial conflict, is not entirely 
discredited, since the results of respondents who perceived themselves to be in the middle 
or upper classes remain statistically significant. Although this variable is based on where 
respondents choose to place themselves, it potentially suggests the power of perception in 
influencing one’s wellbeing and calls for further research. 
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 As before, the results of FEFAM and PREMARSX continue to produce 
statistically significant results even when other variables are controlled for. Thus, it is 
possible that a relationship between attitudes regarding gender roles and premarital sex 
and divorce may exist. According to Table 3.6, for each additional reported level for the 
variable FEFAM, the risk of divorce decreases by 4.8%. The extremely traditional nature 
of the gender roles that are associated with this variable would logically reject the option 
of divorce, since it fails to fit into the image of a happy, functional family. This 
traditional mindset is consistent with Schwartz and Han’s (2014) application of Becker’s 
exchange theory (1974), that the gains of marriage are maximized when benefits 
associated with gender roles are utilized, and the risk of divorce is therefore heightened 
when this balance of power is challenged. Respondents who agree that men should 
provide and women should stay in the home clearly adhere to these traditional gender 
roles. The fact that they have lower divorce rates implies that they have avoided 
challenging the balance of power. Although the values and formation of the typical 
American family may have changed over the past few decades, the ideals held by the 
older, more traditional family remain the same.  
 The variable PREMARSX also continues to produce significant results, implying 
a strong relationship between opinions on premarital sex and the risk of divorce. With 
each additional level reported by respondents, the risk of divorce increases by 18.3%. 
Halem (1980) applies conflict theory, arguing that human beings are constantly at battle 
with society and the only thing keeping the family together is the necessity of humans to 
control their sexual desires. Starting with the end of the need for people to control 
themselves, the dissolution of marriage began. These results can also be seen through a 
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functionalist perspective, which stems from Halem’s conflict theory. One of the 
traditional functions of marriage is in the rearing of children, accomplished through the 
act of sex. This role allotted marriage a considerable degree of purpose, yet this purpose 
hinged upon that particular function. Once birth control and contraception deemphasized 
this notion, the functions originally associated with this purpose declined, simultaneously 
weakening the function of marriage in society. 
 One of the topics discussed in the literature review had to do with the effects of 
women’s entrance into the labor force. Unfortunately, there was a very limited range of 
options to measure this trend. The variable FECHLD asks respondents whether they 
believe that women working outside of the home are able to develop relationships with 
their children. Although this variable did not produce significant results in Table 3.5, it 
does in Table 3.6 with the application of other controls. This finding suggests that 
respondents who disagree that working women are able to create relationships with their 
children are at a decreased risk of divorce. This supports Rogers’s (2004) economical 
independence theory, which maintains that women begin to perceive divisions within the 
family as unequal once they begin contributing to the overall income. In other words, 
families who are against the participation of women in the workforce are able to preserve 
these divisions of power without question, since women are unable to contribute 
financially.  
 Applied separately, these variables offer some significant insight into which 
attributes contribute to the risk of divorce. However, many of these results become non-
significant when applied together. By using the equation mentioned in the Methods 
section, I can determine how well these controls explain the divorce rate by measuring 
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the change in decade coefficients once the controls have been applied (see page 44). 
These controls explain the Constant by 15.25%, thus only accounting for about one-fifth 
of the overall divorce rate in the 1970s. For the 1980s, this equation results with -3.29%, 
which means that the correlates used in this study have changed in such a way from the 
1970s to the 1980s that the divorce rate would have been 3.29% higher if the population 
in the 1980s had the same characteristics as in the 1970s. Using this explanation and the 
results of the 1990s and 2000s (-8.464% and -9.182%, respectively), I can say that, if 
these variables had not changed in subsequent decades, then the divorce rate would be 
this percent higher than in the 1970s. However, these percentages are not high enough to 
conclude that the variables fully explain the rise in divorce.  
The Effects of the Protective “Umbrella” of Religion 
 In order to study how the effects of particular variables on the divorce rate have 
changed over time, I create interaction terms combining “decades” and a number of 
attributes. Similarly with the regression models, I conduct interaction tests for religion 
both with and also without the variable ATTEND, for the purpose of determining how 
religious participation affects the risk of divorce in different religions and also whether 
these effects have changed over time. Without controlling for participation, a pattern 
among the interaction between religion and the decade “Two Thousands” appears. Since 
this pattern disappears in the next model, I can attribute it to ATTEND. In other words, 
the fact that the combination of most religions and the decade two thousands produced 
positive, statistically significant results that later disappear implies that respondents’ level 
of religious participation accounts for the risk of divorce. This finding supports results 
discussed earlier in this section, as well as the idea presented by Cherlin (2009), that 
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churches changed their ideologies to accommodate to the rising divorce rate. Once the 
effects of these church ideologies have been controlled for with the application of 
ATTEND, these results are no longer statistically significant and have thus been 
explained. The disappearance of statistically significant results among the majority of 
these categories in Model I suggests that the effects of religious affiliation alone on 
divorce have remained unchanged over the years.  
 The combinations of decades with the variable ATTEND, which measures the 
frequency of respondents’ religious participation, seals the relevance of Cherlin’s idea 
(2009) to this study. Relative to the 1970s, the effects of religious participation on the 
risk of divorce remain unchanged in the 1980s. However, the 1990s and 2000s both 
produce highly statistically significant results. Thus, the protective effects of attending 
religious services on the risk of divorce have, with some suddenness, been greatly 
reduced prior to the 1970s. As Cherlin (2009) explains, faced with the growing divorce 
rate, many churches were forced to change their policies and teachings (Cherlin 2009). 
Thus, as these results indicate, church membership during the earlier half of the twentieth 
century reinforced the traditional, stereotypical American family; yet as churches altered 
their ideologies, the option of divorce became less unwarranted, explaining the 
decreasing effects that church attendance has had on the risk of divorce. This original 
family notion supported by the church supports the initially negative effects of ATTEND 
that are displayed in Model C in Table 3.2 and as the main effect in Table 3.7. Compared 
to respondents with no religion, those attending religious services have a decreased risk 
of divorce in the 1970s, yet the effects of this variable are diminished in subsequent 
decades.  
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 The two categories whose results continue to stand out in Model I are those of 
Black Protestantism and Judaism. Relative to the 1970s, when Black Protestantism 
increased the risk of divorce by two times relative to those with no religion, subsequent 
decades indicate that the effects of Black Protestantism diminish the risk of divorce. The 
results from the combination of the decades and Black Protestantism not only produce 
statistically significant results for all three recoded variables, but they also get 
progressively significant as the decades increase. As explained earlier in the regression 
analysis (Table 3.2), the effect of Black Protestantism on the risk of divorce becomes 
significant with the addition of ATTEND. Similarly with Table 3.2, the slope of the main 
effect of Black Protestantism in Table 3.7 is positive. Yet, the results of interaction terms 
suggest that the effects of Black Protestantism have become stronger and prevent the risk 
of divorce in subsequent decades. This finding can be explained by a more recent 
analysis of the results found by Peck (1982). This study suggests that, upon gaining their 
freedom, Protestantism offered Blacks a sense of community in a group that would not 
reject them, like white Christianity did. However, the Black Protestant church is weaker 
now than it was in the 1970s, making this explanation slightly outdated. These findings 
can thus be explained through the secularization of America. After the Civil Rights 
movement, the emphasis originally placed on the importance of being an active member 
of the black church was reduced. Once it became acceptable to be black and not part of a 
church, members who belonged but did not believe or behave accordingly fell away, 
leaving only those who continued to faithfully follow the church’s teachings. Through 
their dedication to church values, these individuals may gain certain benefits, such as 
support, that make them less prone to divorce. People who remain as members of the 
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back church may well be distinct both from other African Americans and also from other 
Christians, since their continued participation requires dedication to certain ideologies. 
Thus, although church participation has been controlled for in this analysis, I believe it is 
possible that affiliation alone could lead to a strengthening of the values taught by the 
church, since members would need to have a strong commitment to it already. Although 
there is limited research on this topic, Peck (1982) suggests that the dedication of 
members to the Black Protestant church provides couples with the resources they need to 
decrease their risk of divorce. 
 Since the results of the interaction terms for decade and Jewish produced the same 
results, even with the addition of ATTEND, we must assume that the positive 
relationship between the risk of divorce and Judaism is real and due to something besides 
participation. Although the results found in Table 3.2 imply that the risk of divorce 
among Jewish respondents is due to participation, the fact that the results of Models H 
and I are so similar suggests a need for some other explanation. In the 1970s, Judaism 
reduced the risk of divorce by about half. However, the results of this interaction indicate 
that in subsequent decades, the preventative characteristics associated with Judaism have 
not only been greatly reduced, but have in fact been reversed. As of the 2000s, Judaism’s 
influence actually increases the risk of divorce. This difference presents the most drastic 
change among all of the variables. Unlike many of the other religions mentioned, 
Judaism has never considered divorce to be a sin; on the contrary, “at times divorce is 
appropriate and possibly even a Jewish and moral good” (Broyde and Ausubel 
2005:229). The switch from Judaism’s preventing divorce to making it more likely is not 
entirely unfounded. As explained through an analysis of a survey conducted in 1990, the 
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percent of college graduates among the Jewish population was 55%, compared to 24% of 
the non-Jewish population and this number goes up in subsequent decades. This growth 
in the percentage of the Jewish population attending college may have resulted in a 
heightened amount of women entering the workforce, which has previously been cited as 
a cause of the increased divorce rate (Rogers 2004; Schwartz and Han 2014). Further, in 
a study conducted by Broyde and Ausubel (2005) from the 1970s, it was found that Jews 
tend to be more liberal than non-Jews on topics such as premarital sex, which could 
potentially contribute to the acceptance of divorce by the Jewish population. If the Jewish 
mindset was liberal in the 1970s, then their heightened risk of divorce may be due to an 
increase in this liberated mentality. Thus, unlike many other religions, participation and 
church teachings cannot be credited with the divorce rate but instead, a change in the 
Jewish mindset.  
The Traditional Mindset 
 In order to determine the degree to which respondents’ traditional values have 
changed over the years, I conduct a cross-tabulation of year and FEFAM, FECHLD and 
PREMARSX (Tables 3.8, 3.9, 3.10). From the year 1972 to 2012, the number of 
respondents agreeing that it was better for men to work and for women to stay at home is 
nearly cut in half. Respondents that believe working mothers have no negative impact on 
their relationship with their child also increased almost 20 percentage points over the 
course of forty years. Finally, respondents that believe sex before marriage is “Always 
Wrong” or “Almost Always Wrong” dropped by 20 percentage points as well. Clearly, 
some sort of significant change has occurred over the course of the past forty years. 
However, results in Table 3.8 show that, relative to the main effect, each of the 
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interaction terms produced statistically non-significant results. This means that, while 
changes in people’s attitudes may have resulted in an ideological revolution, the effects 
that these traditional mindsets have had on the risk of divorce has remained unchanged 
over the years. Given that respondents feeling strongly about FEFAM, FECHLD, and 
PREMARSX seem to fall on the highly conservative and highly liberal ends of the 
spectrum, these findings suggest that those who continue to have traditional mindsets 
over the years maintain their marital status and vise versa, or that the divorce rate is due 
to other, less extreme variables.  
Shortcomings in This Study 
 Although the General Social Survey provided me with convenient, accessible 
data, it also caused a number of obstacles. The process of choosing my variables revolved 
almost entirely around the consistency with which they were asked since the start of 
survey. Many of the variables that encompassed what I wanted to measure were either 
not asked with enough consistency or were not representative of the entire population. 
This is especially true with the attitude and opinion-based questions, most of which were 
only used a handful of times. Variables such as “MARFREE”, which asks respondents 
whether they agree or disagree with the statement, “Personal freedom is more important 
than the companionship of marriage”, would have been useful in the discussion of 
Americans’ emphasis on personal freedom. “DECCHURH”, which asks respondents to 
state how important they think the “Teachings of your church or synagogue” are in 
making decisions about everyday life, would have been useful in discussing the 
importance of religious teachings in the decision to get divorced.  
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 Most of the variables that have been asked since the 1970s have also been 
changed or reworded, skewing their distributions. For example, the variable RACE, 
which is the most consistently used race variable available, only has the options “White”, 
“Black” and “Other” until fairly recently, categories which clearly do not capture the 
diversity that is America. Similarly with religion, a more inclusive array of categories is 
not even offered until the year 1998.  
 Finally, and most fundamentally, the General Social Survey presents a challenge 
for my dependent variable measure. Since these measures cannot follow the same people 
or monitor the changes that take place in their lives, I cannot be sure that the event of 
their divorce is preceded by the measures of current statuses such as income, education, 
religion, etc. In other words, respondents may have divorced in the past, yet since then, 
have changed religions, attained a higher religious degree, and have a higher income. 
Since these measures would have come after the event of their divorce, I cannot say with 
any certainty that the cause of their divorce is attributable to their most recent 
demographic statuses.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Future studies could attempt to identify the variables that I did not study, and 
further help explain the divorce rate. For example, I did not include variables having to 
do with children, which may have a significant effect on the leveling out of the divorce 
rate. This study was further limited by the fact that some people may have had numerous 
divorces, yet present GSS variables are unable to measure that. If possible, having a 
variable that measures the amount of divorces per individual may help to explain patterns 
in the divorce rate and in the risk of certain individuals to get divorced repeatedly. Using 
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GSS as my primary source of information created some obstacles, since many variables 
were not asked consistently enough to be included in the final analysis. Although I was 
able to find demographic variables that are used consistently enough, many of the 
attitudinal variables would have been helpful for providing insight into the importance of 
religious teachings, traditional family values, the degree to which respondents value their 
personal freedom more than their family, opinions regarding the difficulty of obtaining a 
divorce, etc. Future studies could find other, more commonly used variables to measure 
how attitudes and opinions affect an individuals’ risk of getting divorced, and also that 
better explain the trend of divorce, something that has become a regular occurrence and a 
characteristic of the American mindset (Cherlin 2009).  
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Appendix 
General Social Survey variables 
 
AGEWED- independent variable 
4a. If every married: How old were you when you first married? 
12-90 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 2006 
 
ATTEND- independent variable 
105. How often do you attend religious services? 
0=NEVER, 1=LT ONCE A YEAR, 2=ONCE A YEAR, 3=SEVRL TIMES A YR, 
4=ONCE A MONTH, 5=2-3X A MONTH, 6=NRLY EVERY WEEK, 7=EVERY 
WEEK, 8=MORE THAN ONCE A WK, 9=DK, NA 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
BlackProt- independent variable 
Recoded from Reltrad, “Black Protestant.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Blackrace- independent variable 
Recoded from RACE, “Black.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
CatholicTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from Reltrad, “Catholic.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
CLASS- independent variable 
185a. If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you 
say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class? 
1= LOWER CLASS, 2=WORKING CLASS, 3=MIDDLE CLASS, 4=UPPER CLASS, 
5=NO CLASS, 0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA 
1972, 1973, 1074, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
CONINC- independent variable 
1657. Inflation-adjusted family income- standardized at 2000 constant dollars 
 
DEGREE- independent variable 
19. If finished 9th-12th grade: Did you ever get a high school diploma or a GED 
certificate?  
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0=LT HIGH SCHOOL, 1=HIGH SCHOOL, 2=JUNIOR COLLEGE, 3=BACHELOR, 
4=GRADUATE, 8=DK, 9=NA 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
DENOM- independent variable 
104a. If Protestant: What specific denomination is that, if any? 
10=AM BAPTIST ASSO, 11=AM BAPT CH IN USA, 12=NAT BAPT CONV OF AM 
13=NAT BAPT CONV USA, 14=SOUTHERN BAPTIST, 15=OTHER BAPTIST, 
18=BAPTIST-DK WHICH, 20=AFR METH EPISCOPAL, 21=AFR METH EP ZION, 
22=UNITED METHODIST, 23=OTHER METHODIST, 28=METHODIST-DK 
WHICH, 30=AM LUTHERAN, 31=LUTH CH IN AMERICA, 32=LUTHERAN-MO 
SYNOD, 33=WI EVAN LUTH SYNOD, 34=OTHER LUTERHAN, 
35=EVANGELICAL LUTH, 38=LUTHERAN-DKWHICH, 40=PRESBYTERIAN C IN 
US, 41=UNITED PRES CH IN UA, 42=OTHER PRESBYTERIAN, 
43=PRESBYTERIAN, MERGED, 48=PRESBYTERIAN-DK WHICH, 
50=EPISCOPAL, 60=OTHER, 70=NO DEMONINATION, 0=IAP, 98=DK, 99=NA 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
DIVBEST- dependent variable 
1299. Do you agree or disagree…Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can’t 
seem to work out their marriage problems.  
1= STRONGLY AGREE, 2= AGREE, 3=NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4= 
DISAGREE, 5= STRONGLY DISAGREE, 0= IAP, 8= CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NA 
1994, 2002, 2012 
 
DIVLAW- dependent variable 
215a. Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now? 
1=EASIER, 2=MORE DIFFICULT, 3=STAY SAME, 0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA 
1974, 1975, 1976, 1977 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 
1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 
 
DIVNOW- dependent variable 
1284. In general, would you say that the law now makes it easy or difficult for people 
who want to get divorced? 
1=VERY EASY, 2=FARILY EASY, 3=NEITHER, 4=FAIRLY DIFFICULT, 5=VERY 
DIFFICULT, 0=IAP, 8=CANT CHOOSE, 9=NA 
1988 
 
DIVORCE- dependent variable 
4b. If currently married or widowed: Have you ever been divorced or legally separated? 
1=YES, 2=NO, 0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA 
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1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
Divorced- dependent variable 
Divorced currently or ever divorced? Recoded from MARITAL and DIVORCE 
0=NO, 2=EVER BEEN DIVORCED (MAY BE REMARRIED) 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
Eighties- independent variable 
Recoded from Decade, “Eighties.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989. 
 
EightiesXATTEND- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “ATTEND.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989 and religious participation.  
 
EightiesXBlackProt- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Black Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Black 
Protestantism.  
 
EightiesXCatholicTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Catholic.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Catholicism.  
 
EightiesXEvangelical- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Evangelical Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Evangelical 
Protestantism.  
 
EightiesXJewishTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Jewish.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Judaism.  
 
EightiesXOtherTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Other Religion.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with other traditions.  
 
EightiesXlthighschool- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Less Than High School.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents with less than a high school degree. 
 
EightiesXMainlineProt- independent variable 
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Recoded from combination of “eighties” and “Mainline Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 1980-1989 of respondents identifying with Mainline 
Protestantism.  
 
ENCentral- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “East North Central.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
ESCentral- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “East South Central.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Evangelical- independent variable 
Recoded from Reltrad, “Evangelical Protestant.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
EVDIV- dependent variable 
1291. Were you ever divorced? 
1=YES, 2=NO, 3-NEVER MARRIED, 0=IAP, 9=NA 
1988, 1994 
 
FECHLD- independent variable 
252. Now I’m going to read several more statements. As I read each one, please tell me 
whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. a. A working 
mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother 
who does not work. 
1=STRONGLY AGREE, 2=AGREE, 3=DISAGREE, 4=STRONGLY DISAGREE, 
0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA 
1977, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 
 
FEFAM- independent variable 
252. Now I’m going to read several more statements. As I read each one, please tell me 
whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. d. It is much 
better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman 
takes care of the home and family. 
1=STRONGLY AGREE, 2=AGREE, 3=DISAGREE, 4=STRONGLY DISAGREE, 
0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA 
1977, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 
 
Highschool- independent variable 
Recoded from DEGREE, “High school.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
INCLT60384- independent variable 
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Recoded from CONINC, “Income less than 60384” in in constant 2000 dollars. 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
INC60385to120385- independent variable 
Recoded from CONINC, “Income from 60385 to 120385” in constant 2000 dollars. 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
INC120386andup- independent variable 
Recoded from CONINC, “Income from 120386 and up” in constant 2000 dollars. 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
JewishTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from Reltrad, “Jewish.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
LessthanHS- independent variable 
Recode from DEGREE, “Less Than High School.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Lowerworkingclass- independent variable 
Recoded from CLASS, “Lower and working classes.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
LT21Agewed- independent variable 
Recoded from AGEWED, “Less than 21.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
MainlineProt- independent variable 
Recoded from Reltrad, “Mainline Protestant.” 
Yes=1, n=0. 
 
MARCOHRT- independent variable 
1652. Marriage cohort of the respondent.  
1900-1994 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 
 
MARDIV- dependent variable 
1280. Do you agree or disagree? i. Couples don’t take marriage seriously enough when 
divorce is easily available. 
1= STRONGLY AGREE, 2= AGREE, 3=NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4= 
DISAGREE, 5= STRONGLY DISAGREE, 0= IAP, 8= CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NA 
1988 
 
MARFREE- independent variable 
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1280. Do you agree or disagree? b. Personal freedom is more important than the 
companionship of marriage 
1= STRONGLY AGREE, 2= AGREE, 3=NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4= 
DISAGREE, 5= STRONGLY DISAGREE, 0= IAP, 8= CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NA 
1988, 1996 
 
MARITAL- dependent variable 
4. Are you currently—married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been 
married? 
1=MARRIED, 2=WIDOWED, 3=DIVORCED, 4=SEPARATED, 5=NEVER 
MARRIED, 9=NA 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
MARNOMAR- independent variable 
1280. Do you agree or disagree? e. It is better to have a bad marriage than no marriage at 
all.  
1= STRONGLY AGREE, 2= AGREE, 3=NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, 4= 
DISAGREE, 5= STRONGLY DISAGREE, 0= IAP, 8= CAN’T CHOOSE, 9=NA 
1988, 1994, 2002 
 
MiddleAtlantic- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “Middle Atlantic.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Middleupperclass- independent variable 
Recoded from CLASS, “Middle and upper classes.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Mountain- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “Mountain.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
NewEngland- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “New England.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Nineties- independent variable 
Recoded from Decade, “Nineties.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999. 
 
NinetiesXATTEND- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “ATTEND.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999 and religious participation. 
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NinetiesXBlackProt- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Black Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Black 
Protestantism.  
 
NinetiesXCatholicTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Catholic.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Catholicism.  
 
NinetiesXEvangelical- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Evangelical Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Evangelical 
Protestantism.  
 
NinetiesXJewishTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Jewish.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Judaism.  
 
NinetiesXOverTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Other Religion.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with other traditions.  
 
NinetiesXlthighschool- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Less Than High School.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents with less than a high school degree. 
 
NinetiesXMainlineProt- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “nineties” and “Mainline Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 1990-1999 of respondents identifying with Mainline 
Protestantism.  
 
Northregion- independent variable 
Recoded from Region, “North region” includes NewEngland, MiddleAtlantic, 
ENCentral, WNCentral, Mountain, Pacific. 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
NoTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from Reltrad, “None.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Otherrace- independent variable 
Recoded from RACE, “Other race.” 
Yes=1, no=0 
 
OtherTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from Reltrad, “Other Religion.” 
	  100	  	  
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Over21Agewed- independent variable 
Recoded from AGEWED, “Over 21.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Pacific- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “Pacific.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
PREMARSX- independent variable 
217. There’s been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are 
changing in this country. If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you 
think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at 
all? 
1=ALWAYS WRONG, 2=ALMST ALWAYS WRONG, 3=SOMETIMES WRONG, 
4=NOT WRONG AT ALL, 5=OTHER, 0=IAP, 8=DK, 9=NA 
1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 
1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 
 
RACE- independent variable 
24. What race do you consider yourself? 
1=WHITE, 2=BLACK, 3=OTHER 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
REGION- independent variable 
Region of interview 
1=NEW ENGLAND, 2=MIDDLE ATLANTIC, 3=E. NOR. CENTRAL, 4=W. NOR. 
CENTRAL, 5=SOUTH ATLANTIC, 6=E. SOU. CENTRAL, 7=W. SOU. CENTRAL, 
8=MOUNTAIN, 9=PACIFIC 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 
1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 
 
RELIG- independent variable 
104. What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other 
religion, or no religion? 
1=PROTESTANT, 2=CATHOLIC, 3=JEWISH, 4=NONE, 5=OTHER, 6=BUDDHISM, 
7=HINDUISM, 8=OTHER EASTERN, 9=MOSLEM/ISLAM, 10=ORTHODOX-
CHRISTIAN, 11=CHRISTIAN, 12=NATIVE AMERICAN, 13=INTER-
NINDENOMINATIONAL, 98=DK, 99=NA 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
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Reltrad- independent variable 
Recoded from DENOM and RELIG, “Religious tradition.” 
Evangelical=1, MainlineProt=2, BlackProt=3, CatholicTrad=4, JewishTrad=5, 
OtherTrad=6, NoTrad=7. 
 
SAtlantic- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “South Atlantic.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Seventies- independent variable 
Recoded from Decade, “Seventies.” 
Responses from the years 1972-1979. 
 
SEX- independent variable 
23. Code respondent’s sex 
1=MALE, 2=FEMALE 
1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
 
SomeCollege- independent variable 
Recoded from DEGREE, “Some college.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Southregion- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “South region” includes WSCentral, ESCentral, SAtlantic. 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
Twothousands- independent variable 
Recoded from Decade, “Two thousands.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012. 
 
TwothousandsXATTEND- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “ATTEND.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Evangelical 
Protestantism.  
 
TwothousandsXBlackProt- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Black Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Black 
Protestantism.  
 
TwothousandsXCatholicTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Catholic.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Catholicism.  
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TwothousandsXEvangelical- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Evangelical Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Evangelical 
Protestantism.  
 
TwothousandsXJewishTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Jewish.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Judaism.  
 
TwothousandsXOverTrad- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Other Religion.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with other traditions.  
 
TwothousandsXlthighschool- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Less Than High School.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents with less than a high school degree. 
 
TwothousandsXMainlineProt- independent variable 
Recoded from combination of “twothousands” and “Mainline Protestant.” 
Responses from the years 2000-2012 of respondents identifying with Mainline 
Protestantism.  
 
Whiterace- independent variable 
Recoded from RACE, “White.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
WNCentral- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “West North Central.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
 
WSCebtral- independent variable 
Recoded from REGION, “West South Central.” 
Yes=1, no=0. 
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